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This thesis addresses one dimension of "naval diplomacy," namely submarine
naval diplomacy. It examines the suitability and/or desirability of employing
submarine forces for naval-diplomatic purposes. It reviews the historical record
of "underwater gunboat diplomacy," the particular aims that its practitioners have
sought to achieve, and it examines the opportunities and constraints for the
assignment of submarines for future naval diplomacy purposes.
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I. THE NATURE OF NAVAL DIPLOMACY
A. INTRODUCTION
The use of armed force short of war to gain political advantage has been
practiced throughout history. Also historically, navies have commonly been the
military-diplomatic instrument of choice for projecting—explicitly or implicitly -
-the threat of politics by other means. This has been especially so for the United
States. According to Blechman and Kaplan's oft-cited study, naval forces
participated in 177 out of 215 recorded incidents of U.S. military diplomacy
between 1946 and 1975 |Ref. 1).
Naval forces are relatively unencumbered by territorial claims and enjoy
world-wide mobility—freedom of navigation—without precipitating warfare.
However, "freedom" does not imply that all areas of the world ocean are politically
equivalent. In naval diplomacy there is a vast difference between the political
signal sent by a nations naval combatant patrolling the high seas and that same
combatant patrolling just outside an opposition's territorial waters in an adjacent
bay or gulf. However, during peacetime the naval combatant is free to politically
navigate with little risk of war, and during wartime some level of this geographic
political differentiation is likely to remain exploitable. (Ref. 2]
This thesis addresses one dimension of "naval diplomacy," namely submarine
naval diplomacy. Its purpose is to examine the suitability and/or desirability of
employing submarine forces for naval-diplomatic purposes. It reviews the
historical record of "underwater gunboat diplomacy," the particular aims that its
practitioners have sought to achieve, and it examines the opportunities and
constraints for the assignment of submarines for future naval diplomacy purposes.
B. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
The first task is to explain what "naval diplomacy" is and what it is not.
What follows is a review of candidate definitions from different recognized pieces
of literature on the subject. The hope is that one accepted definition or, if
necessary, an aggregate of accepted definitions can be used as a standard for this
work. It is not implied that the references cited are meant to be exhaustive on the
subject of naval much less military diplomacy; they are chosen for their focus on
the application of theory, rather than theory itself.
Naval diplomacy is widely believed to have provided maritime powers with
an effective tool of deterrence and coercion. James Cable in his seminal work,
Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979 [Ref. 31, provides this definition:
Gunboat diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise
than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either
in the furtherance of an inter-national dispute or else against foreign
nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state,
(emphasis added) (Ref. 3:p. 39]
Addressing the larger question of the use of U.S. armed forces as a political
instrument Blechman and Kaplan had the following to say;
A political use of armed force occurs when physical actions are taken by
one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a
deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared
to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without
engaging in a continuing contest of violence. (Ref. l:p. 12]
Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell (Ref. 4] builton the definition of Blechman
and Kaplan concerning naval applications:
Naval diplomacy is the employment of naval power directly in the service
of foreign policy. Like all forms of diplomacy it is intended to influence the
thoughts and actions of foreign decision-makers. It can be practiced in
cooperative ways--by employing naval forces to make goodwill port visits
or to furnish humanitarian or technical assistance. But it has been of far
greater consequence (though less frequently encountered) in its coercive
forms, when naval forces are used to threaten, or impose, violent sanctions.
(Ref. 4:p. xiii)
Geoffrey Till (Ref. 5] portrays naval diplomacy as follows:
A relatively new phrase covering maritime activities at the less dangerous
end of the spectrum of procedures which one country may use to influence the
behavior of another. The full spectrum ranges from uninhibited military
attack at one extreme to routine diplomatic persuasion at the other, and it
has no discontinuities; diplomatic activities merge imperceptibly into threats
and acts of war. Although in naval diplomacy, power is exploited rather than
force expended, particular occasions may be thought to warrant acts of
physical coercion. (Ref. 5:p. 209]
These definitions share the following stated or implied attributes: (1) the
activity of naval forces is intended to influence behavior; (2) there is a broad
spectrum of activity that qualifies as naval diplomacy; (3) the lower limit of that
spectrum of activity is benign in nature; and (4) the upper limit of that spectrum
falls short of the state of war, but can include violence. The difficulty lies in
precisely describing the upper limit of this activity; i.e., at what point does an act
of violence become an act of war? Can violence exist without war itself? And, if
violence can exist without war, can this violent activity still be legitimately
classified as diplomacy? The differences in the above definitions either hinge on
these questions or they are trivial in comparison. A rigorous legal solution to this
entanglement is beyond the scope of this thesis. The following is a modest attempt
to provide order and definition to the upper bound of naval diplomacy.
The International Relations Dictionary'(Ref'. 6] provides abarely discernable
path through this maze. Diplomacy is distinguished from the broader idea of
foreign policy in the sense that, "diplomacy involves means and mechanisms . . .
[including] the operational techniques whereby a state pursues its interests
beyond its jurisdiction." [Ref. 6:p. 241] These operational techniques do not
exclude the force of arms. Often when an aggressor nation uses force of arms it
produces a fait accompli and may in the process, from the victim's viewpoint,
commit illegalities. The victim nation must either accept or react to the new
situation [Ref. 6:p. 243]. Actions "short of war" that would normally involve
military forces include: reprisals ("undertaking a normally illegal action to
retaliate against a state that had perpetrated a wrong"), a blockade, and the
occupation of foreign territory [Ref. 6:p. 1911. The Dictionary's entry under
blockade (normally and act of war) provides the following clarification: "A pacific
blockade, considered not an act of war but a reprisal for a legal wrong, may be
levied by one state on another during peacetime to deny the latter's ships (but not
those of other nations) access to the blockaded nation's ports." (Ref. 6. p. 1 94]
"Reprisal" is classified as a "coercive measure," and includes "shows of force"
and pacific blockades as diplomatically legitimate measures undertaken by
military forces. However, this definition concludes with this caveat; "Reprisals
taking the form of military action against an offending state are no longer legally
permissible under the peaceful-settlement and collective-security provisions of
the U N Charter." [Ref. 6:p. 256]
Reprisals outside these latter limitations are not unknown in U.S. postwar
history. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States sought to
forestall the "act of war" label by calling the blockade of Soviet merchant vessels
en route Cuba a "quarantine.' Also, U.S. acts of reprisal were carried out in the
course of recent navaJ operations in the Persian Gulf, for instance, the destruction
of Iranian oil platform surveillance posts and naval vessels after the USS Samuel
B. Roberts struck an Iranian mine on 14 April 1988 |Ref. 7]. This latter event and
others illustrate Cable's thesis that the age of gunboat diplomacy is not past, but
is thriving.
This tortuous path of definitions and examples shows that violence can exist
without war and that violence can be considered part of diplomacy. Even so, the
point at which an act of violence becomes an act of war is yet to be defined. Cable
provides amplification on this point:
... an act of war may either continue an existing war, be deliberately
intended to start a war or liable to provoke the victim into starting one.
An act of coercive diplomacy ... is intended to obtain some specific
advantage from another state and forfeits its diplomatic character if it
either contemplates the infliction of injury unrelated to obtaining that
advantage or results in the victim attempting the infliction of injury after
the original objective has either been achieved or abandoned. Coercive
diplomacy is thus an alternative to war and, if it leads to war, we must not
only hold that it has failed: we may even doubt whether it ever deserved the
name. (Ref. 3:p. 38j
Thus, the upper limit of naval diplomatic violence must not only be an act
not intended to start a war, but also one calculated not to incite a military
response. This threshold can vary greatly in magnitude, depending on the actors
involved, locations, force levels, etc. It appears that such a threshold is
situation-dependant. If so, a single all-encompassingmeasure. or set of measures
can probably not be found.
A problem with Cable's preceding discourse is that if a victim nation is
preparing a reprisal in response to a fait accompli and attempting to present its
own fait accompli, it is semantically committing an act of war even though only an
act of naval diplomacy is intended, in fact. Possibly, the phrase provided by
Blechman and Kaplan is better suited: "without engaging in a continuing contest
of violence." (Ref. 1 :p. 12] The words "continuing contest" leave a lot of room for
conceptual interpretation perhaps, but practically speaking, no more than one or
two cycles of tit-for-tat incidents of limited naval violence are meant.
Coopers, tive diplomacy is not recognized by Cable as he insists that the lower
limit of gunboat diplomacy requires the threat, "however delicate and discreet,
that naval force might actually be applied in support of specific diplomatic
representations." [Ref. 3:p. 391 This demarcation illustrates, appropriately, the
limitations of the gunboat diplomacy label within the larger context of naval
diplomacy.
Edward N. Luttwak [Ref. 8] draws a distinction between the "latent" and
"active" forms of naval diplomacy. The latent form refers to naval forces that may
be coincidentally positioned to exert coercive influence. In the majority of cases,
this influential positioning is wholly unplanned, and instead is inferred by the
victim. As explained by Luttwak, accidental latent naval diplomacy can readily
be converted to active forms. [Ref. 8:p. 11]
The discussion so far has identified various definitional viewpoints on the
meaning of naval diplomacy. The majority shares these judgments: that naval
diplomacy's intent is to influence; that there is a division of labor between
cooperative and coercive forms of naval diplomacy; and that there are thresholds
to both benign and violently destructive acts. The following composite definition
is chosen as a succinct operational description of naval diplomacy for the purposes
of this thesis:
Naval diplomacy is the employment of naval power actively in the service
of national interest with the intent to influence the thoughts and actions of
foreign decision-makers. It can be practiced in the benign cooperative form
and in coercive forms, when naval forces are used to threaten, or impose,
violent sanctions, without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.
C. THE CONDUCT OF NAVAL DIPLOMACY
The foregoing definition has divided acts of naval diplomacy into two broad
categories: cooperative and coercive. The purpose of this section is to
operationalize these modes of conduct for purposes of recognition. This task is
accomplished, as before, with samples from appropriate literature and examples.
Cooperative naval diplomacy is, as stated before, benign in nature. Its task
is not to convey a threat, but to assist or gain favor. Examples include: naval
hospital ships visiting Third World countries, diplomatic port visits, technical
assistance for mine clearance after localized conflict, or local navy familiarization
exercises. 1 Admittedly, port visits and familiarization exercises can have
coercive overtones if they are intended for an external audience, but in
cooperative diplomacy the emphasis is placed on the benefits enjoyed by the host
and visitor. The providing navy often receives needed operational experience,
and the recipient nation gains a service it is unable to provide for itself.
The literature on the forms of coercive diplomacy is very diverse. James
Cable divides coercive diplomacy into four different forms.
Definitive force : "the use of local force to create or remove a fait accompli."
[Ref. 3:pp. 41, 83|
• Purposeful force : "In its purposeful application force does not itself do
anything: it induces someone else to take a decision which would not
otherwise have been taken: to do something or to stop doing it or to
refrain from a contemplated course of action." [Ref. 3:pp. 57-8]
• Catalytic force : a show of force near trouble spots for contingency purposes.
[Ref. 3:p. 67]
x See Dismukes and McConnell [Ref. 4:pp. 105-12]. This is a detailed description
of Soviet mine-clearing efforts in the Bay of Bengal (1972) and the Straits of
Gubal in the Red Sea (1974).
• Expressive force : "warships are employed to emphasize attitudes, to lend
verisimilitude to otherwise unconvincing statements or to provide an outlet
for emotion" in the furtherance of foreign policy objectives. |Ref. 3:p. 81]
Charles D. Allen in his work, The Use of Navies in Peacetime [Ref. 9],
describes four ways in which navies can exert coercive force short of fighting a
war:
• Intervention : landing ground forces from the sea (including amphibious
assault)
• Interposition : isolating a target country from maritime access by another
nation's interventional force or by seaborne commerce, as in a blockade.
• Interdiction : drawing down by attrition, but not completely stopping,
maritime access to a country.
• Protection of (SLOC) [Sea Lines of Communication! : protecting one's own
access to a target country against interdiction or more generally sustaining
one's commerce at sea, typically involving trade with another nation. (Ref.
9:p. 8]
The force composition required for protection of SLOCs should be considered
an aggregate of that required for the previous three divisions. The force
requirements for intervention are self-evident, however, the distinctions between
the force requirements for "interposition" and for "interdiction" are subtle and
require some clarification:
Interposition tends to be employed more in the form of a signal or a threat to
use force, than as an act of violence itself. Interdiction, on the other hand,
gains most of its credibility by an actual attack. [Ref. 9:p. 101
Allen enumerates these "interposition" force requirements:
• High visibility.
• Be strong enough to deter the opposition from resorting to force.
• It must remain in place/remain inviolate.
• It must possess considerable endurance. [Ref. 9:p.l0]
Allen concedes fewer requirements for interdiction:
On the other hand, requirements for interdiction [are] markedly less and
in some cases might involve forces of as little visibility as possible. To be
effective, interdiction needs only to inflict some losses on the enemy SLOC
at irregular and unpredictable intervals to achieve the desired results, which
might range from the requirement for unacceptably heavy enemy escort
requirements to an increase in commercial insurance rates. Thus the force
best suited to interdiction role, at least by a weaker nation, would be
submarines, tactical aircraft, and light surface craft when the SLOC passes
within striking range of their bases. |Ref. 9:pp. 10-11]
Direct comparison of Cable's and Allen's categories would be disingenuous.
Cable's divisions are descriptive of the political limitations on limited naval force
and of the political effects intended; Allen's division on the other hand is
descriptive of the mechanics required to obtain Cable's effects. Said another way.
Cable's terms are those of the political strategist, and Allen's those of the naval
professional.
This discussion of the conduct of naval diplomacy is, again, not intended to
be exhaustive, but rather to explore the diversity of perspectives on the subject.
The two that have been included are sufficient to provide an effective framework
for this thesis and the following discussion of the viability of submarines in naval
diplomacy.
II. THE VIABILITY OF SUBMARINES IN NAVAL DIPLOMACY
A. INTRODUCTION
Military historian John Keegan concluded his history of naval warfare, The
Price of Admiralty [Ref. 10], with the prediction that,
The era of the submarine as the predominant weapon of power at sea must
therefore be recognized as having begun. . . It is now also the ultimate
capital ship, deploying the means to destroy any surface fleet that enters its
zone of operations. . . In a future war the oceans might appear empty again,
swept clear both of merchant traffic and of the navies which have sought so
long to protect it against predators. Yet the oceans' emptiness will be
illusory, for in their deeps new navies of submarine warships, great and
small, will be exacting from each other the price of admiralty. |Ref. 10:pp.
274-5]
Even if it is granted that submarines are "the ultimate capital ship" in
wartime, the question remains whether they are amenable to performing the kinds
of duties that are commonly known as "naval diplomacy," and that have
historically been performed by "impressive" surface combatants such as
battleships and aircraft carriers. One suspects, that were an informal poll to be
taken among naval professionals, diplomats, and others concerned with
international affairs, the result would probably be skewed heavily toward the
negative, even among submariners. One also suspects that one reason for this
view is lack of a dialogue; with the majority opinion rejecting a role for submarines
in naval diplomacy, the subject becomes closed, and "informed" opinion reduced to
dogma that refuses to be challenged by changes in submarine warfare capabilities
or the passage of events. The following is a collection of views on the viability
of submarines in naval diplomacy.
B. VARIOUS VIEWPOINTS
1. Cable and Why Submarines, "Would Not Do"
James Cable's original 1971 view of the submarine as a tool of gunboat
diplomacy is extremely negative. Submarines, he wrote, are "j/?/ie.re/7fJyill-suited
to the exercise of limited naval force." (emphasis added.) For one, he explained,
coercive threats cannot be conveyed by a submarine unless it gives up the tactical
advantage of invisibility and consequently renders itself vulnerable. Next, the
lack of deck guns precludes the modem submarine from applying proportional
force, so that attempts to threaten limited violence are either to likely fail or
result in a shooting war. In other words, the submarine is said to be an all-or-
nothing weapon. Cable goes on to suggest that during peacetime international
crises, as the general tension level increases, naval commanders must deploy more
assets to counter, the submarine threat. In peacetime the submarine threat is un-
concerning, however, as political tensions increase, the violent threat of the
submarine grows more credible. [Ref. 3:p. 152-3]
Stephen S. Roberts has commented on the Soviet use of submarines
during the superpower confrontations at the height of the 19G7 and 1973 Arab-
Israeli wars. His conclusion is rather different from Cable's:
. . . the submarine is in fact an important weapon of Soviet naval
diplomacy. Much of the threat it poses depends, to be sure, on its ability to
operate undetected. Views to the contrary notwithstanding, the submarine
can in this instance communicate a threat without making its exact location
known. For the U.S. Navy knows, and the Soviets know that it knows, that
submarines are an integral component of ACW [anti-carrier warfare] task
groups; hence the U.S. must presume that submarines are a part of any such
groups confronting its carriers. When recognizable ACW task groups are
formed Soviet submarines can and do heighten the apparent level of threat
posed to U.S. naval forces. Moreover, .... the Soviets appear to reveal the
presence of theirsubmarines--including cruise-missile units--from time to
time. Thus, the view that the submarine "is inherently ill-suited to the
exercise of limited naval force" 2 seems without foundation, at least as it
applies to the Soviet Navy of today, when it is confronting the U.S. or
another sophisticated navy, (emphasis in original) [Ref. 4:pp. 211-2]
Cable's response to Robert's observation came in the 1981 edition of
Gunboat Diplomacy. He noted that he had predicted the character of the October
1973 submarine confrontation in fact. Had he not said that the credibility of the
submarine threat is dependent on the general tension level? And had he not
pointed out how submarines operating on the surface may be interpreted as
signalling a reduced threat [Ref. 3;p. 265]? Nevertheless, Cable did concede a
legitimate, albeit severely circumscribed naval diplomatic role for submarines:
Even a scarcely credible Soviet threat may thus exercise two useful
functions: it signals a political objection to American manoeuvres and it may
actually handicap their execution. As such it qualifies as an expressive and
possibly as a purposeful use of limited naval force, even if the action
threatened would, if ever carried out, transcend the bounds of that concept
by constituting an act of war. (Ref. 3:p.265.]
The Falklands conflict prompted a scattering of commentary on the
coercive potential of the submarine. One author wrote:
The deployment of a single nuclear-powered killer submarine to the area
as well as a small garrison with surface-to-air missiles to hold Port Stanley
airfield would most likely have deterred the [Argentine] aggression.^
(emphasis added) [Ref. 11]
The deployment of the British submarines to the South Atlantic proved a reminder
how it is "often the case that a sudden change in international political conditions
requires the use of a military force for a purpose other than those originally
intended." [Ref. 12]
2 Roberts is quoting the 1071 edition of Gunboat Diplomacy
'In later discussion of the Falkland crisis, a miss-handling of a similar
1 an nuclear attack submarine will bi detail* I
John Moore, at the time editor of Jane's Fighting Ships, similarly
remarked how, "the presence of a force of nuclear submarines in the area, unseen
and uncounted, was an important factor rarely commented upon." And, he
observed: "The effect of the presence of nuclear submarines was as salutary as
had been predicted, though this is as much a warning as a comfort." [Ref. 13] This
comment poses an intriguing question, namely if the Falklands war has served to
"prove" the coercive value of the submarine, does this mean that (a) nations will
be more likely to resort to this weapon in future crisis, and (b) the "deterrent
value" of the submarine in crisis short of active hostilities has increased?
When discussing how NATO might respond to a possible Soviet naval
campaign against Norway in support of limited political-military goals, Cable
backs away from ascribing a role for submarines:
Submarines would not do. An invisible presence does not reassure
civilians; a surfaced submarine does not deter professionals. Declaration can
be considered provocative. Shore based aircraft resemble submarines. They
are more effective in battle than in political confrontation. What is needed
is an equally implicit, equally visible, matching response. (Pwef. 14]
In a larger context the above statement could imply that submerged
submarines by themselves are not effective at public assurance. It does imply
that submerged submarines have deterrent value for the professional. The
statement, "Declarations can be considered provocative," ignores that the
presence of a Soviet naval force, apparently intent on invasion, can be just as
provocative. Cable's statement begs the question--is the purpose of dispatching
a naval force meant to "reassure civilians" or to send a message to the potential
aggressor? Nuclear missiles in silos or submarines at sea are not visible to the
civilian populace and may actually do little to assure them, yet no one denies that
their very invisibility enhances th« credibility of deterrence. Naval diplomatic
concepts have direct parallels with those of nuclear deterrence, yet somehow in
Cable's view the instruments of deterrence must now be plainly visible to the
public with little concern for the aggressor's perspective.
It is unclear what type of declaration Cable is referring to, but it could
be inferred to suggest a blockade, enforced by submarines, as in the Falklands
conflict. Cable's claims that an "invisible presence" does not "reassure civilians,"
but that a "declaration" of that presence is "provocative," appear inconsistent.
Surface combatants by their presence would be just as provocative to the potential
aggressor, yet would reassure civilians! The British populace, preconditioned by
the success of Falklands submarine blockade, would be reassured by the,
necessarily, provocative submarine presence announcement to a potential
aggressor. Much attention shall be paid to this announcement of submarine
presence, for this may be the crux of the solution to the "visibility" problem
associated with submarine diplomacy.
Vice Admiral Sir Peter Stanford, Royal Navy, in a 1984 discussion of the
relationship between deterrence and naval hardware and fleet structure, includes
a provision for "presence:"
Presence is a fundamental ingredient of deterrent capability. . . And,
presence demands surface ships; submarines, however valuable as fighting
machines, make little contribution to naval diplomacy. [Ref. 15]
While evidently rejecting the submarine's contribution to "presence," Stanford yet
goes on to stress that an operationally effective presence requires that, "a
capacity to surprise (perhaps, by submarine) need[s] to be brought to the notice
of the potential enemies." [Ref. 15:p. 105] Although, Stanford does not elaborate
on how a submarine's operational "capacity to surprise" should be demonstrated,
he seemingly recognizes that the submarine can nevertheless contribute to fleet
functions short of open warfare. Again, the "visibility" problem appears to
confuse the issue.
While discussing criteria for determining the appropriate level of force
to be applied in instances of coercive naval diplomacy, Cable IRef. 16] mentions
the use of submarines in the Falklands crisis:
The presence of the British nuclear submarines would probably not have
kept the Argentine surface fleet in home waters if Conqueror had not sunk
General Belgra.no. A higher level of violence may, of course, seem positively
attractive to a contestant enjoying a clear advantage in the ability to employ
it, but this expedient is likely to carry penalties in the international
environment. [Ref. 16:pp. 45-6]
The context of this statement fits well with Cable's point that each
increase in the level of violence (of any type) is matched by a higher political
price to be paid. This argument is certainly valid and requires later elaboration.
But more important from the perspective of this paper, it also admits to a
legitimate role for submarines in coercive naval diplomacy. Even so. Cable
[Ref. 17] quickly reverts to the "traditional" view, arguing that submarines should
be excluded from the application of limited naval force.
Nor do I count the activities of submarines as gunboat diplomacy. A
warship equipped only with nuclear missiles cannot use or threaten limited
force. 4 Other submarines spend much time peering and prying around foreign
naval bases. If this is just reconnaissance and training for a potential war,
it is not gunboat diplomacy. [Ref. 17:p.38]
This comment highlights the limitations of Cable's definition of "gunboat
diplomacy." Cable may be quite correct that, demonstrations of strategic nuclear
force cannot be considered acts intended to "secure advantage,. . . in the
furtherance of an inter-national dispute or else against foreign nationals "
4 Cable has simplified his argument with the adjective phrase, "equipped only
with nuclear missiles." This borders on propaganda and misrepresents the fact
that all known SSBK classes are also armed with defensive torpedoes that may
e offensive torpedoes aftei all missiles are fired.
and that therefore such demonstrations can not fall under the rubric of "gunboat
diplomacy" (as defined by Cable) [Ref. 3:p. 39]. However, nuclear (or for that
matter conventional as well) deterrence and "signalling" are aimed at goals
broader than immediate "advantage," namely to influence the thoughts and actions
of foreign decision makers. Cable's comment was directed at the unprecedented
Soviet public announcement, in early 1984, that DEL 7,4- class nuclear powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), had been deployed (for the first known time)
into the Mid-Atlantic as an "analogous response" to North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) deployment of nuclear Pershing II and ground launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs) [Ref. 18]. This incident is covered later in greater detail; suffice
it to say that SSBNs can be and have been used to deliver political messages. 5
Cable's "other submarines" in the vicinity of foreign naval bases refer
to a series of incidents, dating back to the 1960s, in and about Swedish territorial
waters. Aside from the "Whiskey on-the-Rocks" incident in 1981, the identity of
the intruders has remained unverified, though the Soviets are highly suspected.
These incidents are highlighted because of Sweden's neutrality; similar
occurrences within the territorial waters of other, NATO, Scandinavian countries
are less sensationalized, as though it is expected behavior. [Ref. 19]
Although strictly speaking these incidents have so far been non- violent
(although the Swedes have used defensive violence), the fact is that the
penetration of another nations territorial waters falls within the legal limits of
an "act of war." 6 Also, Cable's proposition that training and reconnaissance are
5 It can even be argued that, given their deterrence task, SSBNs exist for no
other reason than to signal political int< nt.
6 Thi "rich; I Lnno • ..: passaj ' [K r . 6:p. 291] does not extend to the
submerged submai in
not part of his definition of gunboat diplomacy can be taken at face value; such
acts, again, fall under the heading of deterrence. But it is ludicrous to suggest
that, once detected by the victim nation, a sustained program (20 years) of
"reconnaissance and training" is not intended to derive other benefits. Finally
nuclear deterrence, reconnaissance, and training are only three of the many
possible submarine missions that might have some usefulness in naval diplomacy.
For Cable to limit the explanation of his rejection to only three missions is an
incomplete argument.
As a concluding remark in his article, "The Future of Gunboat
Diplomacy," Cable attempts prophecy; "In the future, gunboat diplomacy ma\
assume different forms and be employed by different navies and against different
victims " [Ref. 17:p. 41) Cable concludes that the forms of coercive naval
diplomacy are not fixed, yet he will not admit any role for the submarine, though
he has acknowledged some roles in the past.
In the 1 986 assessment of the Royal Navy's ability to build, employ, and
maintain an SSN force, Eritish analyst Eric Grove [Ref. 20] made the following
observation.
Given the dependence of SSNs on an intelligence infra-structure that >.:.::
a superpower can provide, Britain's SSNs are more or less adjuncts to the U.S.
Nav\ , although they can be used to good effect on specific national interests
when required- -as the Argentines found out to their detriment. Even here,
however, the political problems of using submarines in a politically sensitive
situation makes them weapons relevant only in a high-level operation. [Ref.
20:p. 129]
This is essentially a rewording of Cable's warning of the increased
political penalties associated with raising the level of violence. However, Grove
introduces another factor that may have significance, namely intelligence. To be
truthful, it is unclear what wartime oi peacetime mission Grove envisages for the
British nuclear submarine fleet, but the professional would argue that there are
many missions that do not require "superpower" intelligence. This does not deny
the close working relationship that may exist between the Royal Navy and U.S.
Navy's submarine forces. Nevertheless, the point is that Grove recognizes a role
for submarines in the naval diplomacy role.
2. The U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy and Submarine Crisis Control
In 1986 the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy [Ref. 21] was first publicly
articulated. It is a conceptual framework that inspires critical thinking about
how, the U.S. Navy may need to fight a global naval conflict with the Soviet Union.
As such, the Maritime Strategy offers broad guidelines for force structure and
training requirements, without anchoring U.S. and NATO operational commanders
to any dogmatic strategic or tactical naval contingencies. The 198G Maritime
Strategy, as stated in the Department of the Navy's Report to the Congress: Fiscal
Years 90-91 [Ref. 22], has evolved into the "maritime component of the U.S.
national military strategy" and has become:
... a fundamental supporting element of the overall national military
strategy, and as such represents a concept of operations for the effective
global employment of maritime forces as a deterrent force or in the event of
combat. [Ref. 22:p. 34]
The "maritime component" is divided into three phases: (1) deterrence
or the transition to war, (2) seizing the initiative, and (3) carrying the fight to
the enemy. The first phase is labeled a period (of undefinable duration) of
"deterrence and crisis control." Force movements at this--non-violent--stage
of the strategy would include the rapid forward deployment of anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) forces, specifically maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and nuclear
powered attack submarines (SSNs). Their purpose would be to place U.S. naval
force in the most advantageous position in the event deterrence fails, and to
signal the American intent to use force, if necessary. [Ref. 21 :p. 9] Thus, the
Maritime Strategy deliberately chooses the submarine as the one type of naval
force that will not only fight an initial "forward defense" most efficiently, but that
is also hoped to conduct Phase I naval diplomacy most credibly.
3. British and U.S. Navy Views on the Future of the Submarine as a Political
Weapon
This scenario is not unique to a potential U.S. -Soviet conflict. For the
Royal Navy's efforts in the Falklands Conflict, too, the SSNs were the first to
arrive on the scene [Ref. 23].
A 1986 security breach allowed a Royal Navy planning document to
become public. The so-called "Towpath Papers" (so-named after the location were
they were found next to the Thames river) discussed threat assessments, fleet
readiness, personnel, ship procurement issues, etc. But, it also cited concern in
the area of submarine warfare. The Labour Party's defense spokesman in
Parliament, David Owen, (himself a former Foreign Minister) paraphrased this
concern.
We iua\ never again face limited war at sea with setpieee surface ship
battles. Rather, in a period of political tension, an undeclared war of stealth
could be played out under the sea. (emphasis added) [Ref. 24]
Accepting Owen's view, it appears that the naval diplomatic role for the submarine
is now fully acknowledged by the Royal Navy.
Vice Admiral D. L. Cooper, U.S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations (Undersea Warfare, OP-02) spoke about the "strategic" future of the
submarine during his Congressional testimony in March 1989 [Ref. 25]. While
relating th I; nami political and technical environment affecting the evolution
of the U.S. Maritime Strategy and the submarine force's contribution to it, Cooper
remarked how, "... the submarine force has assumed a consistently larger role
and is now the dominant contributor to both strategic and tactical deterrence.
"
(emphasis in original) [Ref . 25:p. 3] Discussing the inherent characteristics of the
submarine, the Cooper used the term "leverage" during crisis situations, a term
implying utility in coercive diplomacy and deterrence: "The submarine force," he
claimed, "creates leverage out of proportion to its size because an adversary does
not know whether or in what number submarines are present." (emphasis in
original) [Ref. 25:p. 4] Finally, Vice Admiral Cooper provides an interesting
statistic: "The attack submarine force with ninety-eight SSNs represents over
thirty-five percent of the Navy's combatant ships but uses less than ten percent
of the Navy's budget." [Ref. 25:p. 5] Clearly, the U.S. submarine force is preparing
itself for use in crisis situations short of war. A question remains: are
preparations being made for submarine involvement in crisis situations involving
opposition other than the Soviet Union? If so, at what level?
Admiral Carlisle A. H.Trost, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO),
during congressional testimony in June 1989, responded tc a proposal to
substitute cruise missile carrying submarines for forward deployed carrier battle
groups as a primary deterrent. General Brent Scowcroft had articulated this
proposal prior to becoming President Bush's National Security Advisor. Admiral
Trost's response:
Ho [Scowcroft] put forth, for example, that submarines with cruise missiles
would be adequate replacements for battle groups. 1 doubt that that view
would be shared by any prospective enemy or anyone in a crisis situation who
wanted to take on the United States Navy. Submarines with missiles are
highly capable, but they are out of sight. They are not a conventional crisis
situation deterrent, in that you cannot start shooting cruise missiles over
land as a deterrent to anyone's aggressh intenth n • t< terrorism.
[Ref. 2 M
,
These remarks were consistent with Trost's earlier prepared posture statement in
which he told the U.S. Congress;
I want to emphasize that it is the extensive capability and adaptability of
our embarked carrier air wings, unique in the world, that makes the large
deck carrier the preferred weapon system whenever our national interests
are at risk. [Ref. 22:p. 26]
In the final analysis, our Carrier Battle Groups are the nation's force of
choice in peace and war. There is simply no substitute for their capabilities.
When all is said and done, Carrier Battle Groups are the most cost effective
and combat capable system in the U.S. inventory, and will remain the
cornerstone of U.S. naval capability. (Ref. 22:p. 37]
Admiral Trost has not slighted the submarine force with these
statements. His message instead was that, overall, the best naval force to meet
the entire spectrum of contingencies the Navy must face remains the balanced
Carrier Battle Group (CBG). One must assume that included in each CBG is at least
one SSN, although, Trost did net explicitly say so. Nevertheless, the CNO seems
to suggest that Third World crisis contingencies are the monopoly of the carrier air
wings. This should not imply that the CBG is the only force instrument capable of
"managing" a Third World crisis.
William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr., holds the position that the U.S. is very
cognizant of the need and exe : ution of "perception management" with submarines
with regard to the Soviet Union. However, he feels that with respect to the Third
World nations, the Navy poorly plans for submarine perception management
contingencies [Ref. 27]. In view, of the Navy's operational bias toward the CBG,
it is entirely possible that no planning exists for Third World submarine
perception management. If this is true, it suggests a prevailing attitude that as
long as CEGs are available, there should be no need for submarines in the Third
. | . Dmacy role.
C. CONCLUSION
Views on the value of submarines in naval diplomacy fall into two broad
categories: first there are those who claim that submarines are intrinsically
unsuitable for naval force short of war. Their argument is categorical: submarines
are invisible, non-proportional, and uncontrollable. Next, there are those who
acknowledge a perhaps limited naval diplomatic role for submarines—at least in
the superpower context, but are unwilling or unable to expand this general
concession and suggest practical policy applications. The following chapters
review the "menu" of arguments for and against the submarine diplomatic role.
III. THE CASE AGAINST SUBMARINE DIPLOMACY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter summarizes and examines the various arguments against the use
of submarines in naval diplomacy. Because skepticism is widespread, though often
not articulated, arguments against the coercive use of submarines can be
identified much more readily than arguments in favor. Before submarine diplomacy
can ever to be considered a potentially legitimate naval preoccupation, it is
important tc first take stock of the various constraints that are claimed to
militate against such a development.
B. SUBMARINE LIABILITIES
1 . Lack of Overt Threat
Submarine stealth or covertness is a great tactical strength, but it
renders the submarine invisible and, arguably, unusable for naval diplomacy.
Cable maintains that limited naval force must necessarily remain overt, and he
contends.
A submarine cannot communicate a threat without making its presence
known. Indeed, unless the victim [of gunboat diplomacy] is a fairly
sophisticated and consequently dangerous, warship, the submarine will
actually have to surface, when it ceases to be a superior ship and becomes
acutely vulnerable to almost any warship. [Ref. 3:p. 152]
The first axiom of submarine warfare is to remain undetected (Ref. 28].
Being detected by the foe before placing a weapon in the water is analogous to an
unmarked police car on stakeout inadvertently energizing its siren: entirely
sional. Remaining undetected is the major reason for the submarine's
tactical advantage. If the location of the submarine is known exactly, it cannot
maintain its tactical advantage, and without tactical advantage the submarine
cannot perform its mission effectively. Yet, if its presence is not known, how can
it perform the gunboat diplomacy deterrence mission? The submarine must
somehow be made "visible;" this may require sacrificing some tactical advantage
in return for "strategic/diplomatic" gain. Later discussion will address a possible
solution.
2. Non-proportionality of Submarine Weapons
After World War II, deck guns were removed from submarines, and its
proportional warfare capability was traded for improved submerged mobility.
Additional efforts to improve submerged speeds resulted in streamlined hull forms
with low freeboard, but poor surface seakeeping characteristics that created
extremely hazardous conditions for personnel topside and precluded the return of
the deck gun. The deck gun provided only limited capability in the anticipated
superpower warfare environment, and in today's warfare environment it would be
a waste of precious space and weight.
Present armaments of U.S. attack submarines are designed to inflict
maximum possible damage against surface ships and submarines. This is not to say
that only one torpedo or one missile is required to sink cvay target, but that it
is possible for any single weapon fired to sink any appropriate target. This is not
always the desired effect in naval diplomacy, and this could lead to the
inadvertent outbreak of war, if sinking the target is unintended. With the loss
of the deck gun the submarine can no longer fire a demonstrative shot-across-
the-bow and has thus lost the capability for proportional violence.
3. Low Weapon Utility Against Certain Targets
Current submarine weapons, i.e. torpedoes and cruise missiles, are
designed for targets of appreciable draft or radar cross section. Not all surface
targets that are likely to be encountered in the naval diplomacy environment fit
this requirement. During the Iran-Iraq War in the Persian Gulf, U.S. Navy
combatants exchanged fire numerous times with opposing naval forces that sallied
forth in converted outboard motor pleasure craft (Boghammers). This is an
example of entirely inappropriate targets for submarine weapons. Additionally,
U.S. submarines possess no ability to attack hostile aircraft.
4. Communication Requirements Create Detection Risk
Submarine communications in the receive-only mode are highly reliable.
The reliability of submarine transmissions is equally high. However, transmission
is fundamentally different from reception in that it leaves a clue to its
whereabouts. Accordingly, the greater the number of transmissions the submarine
makes, the greater risk of detection. The large volume of communications that is
normal to a crisis situation would sacrifice stealth and place the mission and the
submarine at risk.
5. Submarine Threat May Lack Credibility
The normal lack of overtness and non-proportionality of a submarine's
weapons has created a "credibility" problem for the submarine. The hypothetical
skipper of a blockade-running merchant vessel does not possess the capability to
detect the submarine. He may be told of the submarine presence or he may have
even sighted the submarine, but he is likely to expect that he will only be fired
upon if the submarine intends tc start a war. Cable explains:
Nor is the silent menace presented by a flotilla of submerged submarin< . I
a surface fleet which ha.-, detected their presence likely to cov, a resolute
victim [the surface fleet], who will calculate that, irrespective of the
outcome of the local naval battle, the submarine will only take action if war
is intended. [Ref. 3:p.l52]
And he continues:
The six Soviet submarines that entered the Caribbean during the Cuban
missile crisis would have been the least of American worries even if their
numbers had been ten times greater. [Ref. 3:pp. 152-3]
With the ubiquitous, unannounced, nonproportional submarine perceived only as
a weapon of war, it will lack credibility as a weapon of naval diplomacy.
C. A SECOND LOOK AT SUBMARINE LIABILITIES
As a counter to the lack of overtness argument, it can be argued that the SSN
is a sufficiently capable platform so that, should it purposely disclose its presence
in a controlled, random manner, the tactical advantage may, in most cases, be
rapidly recovered. Disclosing submarine presence could be performed by broaching
(allowing the submarine's superstructure to break the ocean surface), shooting
flares in the vicinity of adversaries, or the limited random use of active sonar in
the case of warships. Doing so would be far safer and easier, of course, in the
absence vi anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capable surface ships and aircraft. It
would still be possible with these opposing assets present, but it would be much
more difficult, time-consuming, and foolhardy. The preferred method of
maintaining SSN overtness might be for the National Command Authority (NCA) to
announce an SSN "Presence and Intent Notice" (SPIN). 7 This could be done
discretely through diplomatic channels or if public attention is desirable, via the
media. In this manner the SSN gains diplomatic practicality, remains undetected,
and retains the tactical advantage. Something similar was practiced effectively
by the British during the Falkland campaign, although it was not recognized by
many until after the sinking of General Belgrano sinking [Ref. 29].
Since the presence of a submarine in a large geographic area is made known
by the SPIN, the risk of detection, due to high volume communications, is reduced
to a level roughly proportionate to the detectability range (radar or visual) of the
submarine's antenna. But, considering the near-constant communication
requirements of past experiences in naval diplomacy, the rate of antenna exposure
could easily exceed that dictated by prudent submarine practice. The best remedy
is to provide the commanding officer with clear, concise, and appropriate prior
orders and preplanned guidelines, and for the Controlling Authority to resist the
~ A SPIN notice might be worded as follows. "In view of the international
situation, at the request of Republic of Contested Island's Government, the United
States lias established a 200nm maritime warning zone surrounding the Republic
of Contested Islands. This warning zone is enforced by U.S. attack submarines
with instructions to interdict aggressor nation maritime traffic. If the warning
zone is violated by hostile aggressor nation military traffic, the submarines are
authorized to shoot first and ask questions later." Attached to this SPIN would be
a complete copy of the rules of engagement, if deemed appropriate.
8 The Reagan administration's philosophy was to delegate control of operational
forces to the lowest level possible, the theater Commander in Chiefs (CINCs), while
providing them with clear NCA intent and appropriate rules of engagement. One
would think the Bush administration will follow suit. However, the Ford and Carter
administrations were characterized by operational, even tactical, control being
retained at the highest levels. The later style requires constant communications
if flexibility and the perception of control are to be maintained.
Presently the CINCs have operational control over all theater assets
including the SSNs, as well as total flexibility over the whole spectrum of the
diplomatic rule played by those assets. For the purposes of this thesis further
references to the NCA are meant to include the CINCs acting a; operational
lling authorities for the SSNs.
temptation to expect or demand a real-time, play-by-play, narrative from the
scene.
The preceding discussion tacitly accepts the requirement for visibility in
naval diplomacy platforms and tries to establish submarine visibility within that
paradigm. However, there are cases where benefits are derived from non-
visibility. Edward Luttwak, describing words in naval diplomacy with possibly
misleading connotations, suggested "presence" as having:
... an unfortunate connotation in that it implies physical visibility where
none may exist. More important, it suggests passivity where none may be
intended--or perceived. One typical erroneous deduction is that submarines
are inherently unsuitable for "presence" missions. [Ref. 8:p. 2]
The strategic deterrent SSBN draws great credibility from its invisibility, which
provides survivability. Nuclear Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles are
assigned a deterrent mission in the nation's nuclear reserve. These weapons are
co-located with conventional weapons on naval platforms --some visible, some
invisible. The stealth fighter remains shrouded in secrecy despite official
announcement of its existence. All of these systems make contributions to
different levels of deterrence--a form of coercive diplomacy, yet are invisible.
The SSN can proceed to the area of political tension undetected, thus riot
appearing provocative until a time of the government's choosing. Similarly, should
a crisis be resolved while the submarine was en route or prior to its presence
becoming known, it can be withdrawn without political penalty. A strong "visible"
NATO response to a hypothetical Soviet naval force threatening the invasion of
Norway might provoke violent Soviet action to prevent a political/military loss of
face. However, by informing the Soviets through diplomatic channels of a strong
submarine response without public announcement, the £ Lei 11 be able to
withdraw withoul a loss of face. This scenario and th< pi edinj example: ar<
provided to challenge the continued suitability of a categorical visibility
requirement in naval diplomacy platforms.
The non-proportionality of submarine weapons is fading in view of the larger
context of naval warfare in the age of high technology anti-ship missiles (ASMs).
Thin-skinned surface combatants can no longer allow hostile aircraft or missile
launching surface combatants to approach to within weapons range, much less
defensive gun range (the gun being the epitome of the proportional naval weapon)
without hazarding themselves. The rules of engagement (ROE) debates and
revisions have recognized this fact and are being changed to allow the surface
combatant commanding officer tc protect his ship with non-proportional weapons
and actions. The question may arise whether, since the submarine will be much
less exposed to this kind of threat, a non-proportional response is justified. The
answer must be found in the SPIN. The SSN will be allowed nonproportional action
when carrying out the NCA intent, or when protecting itself, other combatants 01
neutrals w ithin the ; ules of engagement. A discussion of the proportional weapon
debate is contained in a later chapter on the future of submarine diplomacy.
In choosing the Cuban missile crisis as an example of the lack of credibility
of submarine ir naval diplomacy, Cable applied a specialized circumstance to the
general field. In this instance a local battle did not exist. Cable's point is that
a local battle would perhaps have triggered total nuclear war regardless of the
participation of submarines. Perhaps this is true of this particular incident or of
superpower confrontations in gunboat diplomacy in general and certainly, it may
have some implications about segments of the maritime strategy, but this limited
condemnation of submarine credibility should not be extended to every possible
circumstance in which submarines could be involved in na\ al dipl
In the context of a Third World "local battle" it can be asked how the "limited
naval force" contributed by the submarine would incite war, whereas the "local
[surface or air] battle" would not. During the 1986 U.S. -Libya "Line of Death"
confrontations in the Gulf of Sidra, would war have resulted from the torpedoing
of a declared "hostile" Libyan patrol boat or submarine by a U.S. SSN? Two Libyan
patrol boats were destroyed by missiles and bombs from aircraft [Ref. 30]. What
difference does it make in gunboat diplomacy if a nonproportional response is
required and the missile is launched from an aircraft or submarine? The answer:
NONE: This is especially so if the submarine's presence had been announced, or
the submarine had been in company with visible naval assets, or both. The same-
holds for the U.S. retaliation for the mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts.
Operation Praying Mantis in April 1988, resulted in the sinking of an Iranian
frigate and patrol boat and the severe damage of another frigate by U.S. aircraft [Ref. 31]
and surface combatants [Ref. 7:pp. 69-70].
The SPIN concept can only partially overcome the credibility problem of the
submarine as a naval diplomatic deterrent. Credibility is a function of intent and
resolve to use one's military capability, and of the opposition's conviction that
intent and capability do exist in fact. If a weapons system capability exists, but
it:, use is so restricted that it may never be used (especially when opportunities
are presented), that capability will not easily engender credibility.
Unfortunately, credibility can sometimes only be established post facto.
Argentina perhaps had some doubts about the capability of British SSNs and the
resolve of the British to use them. But, after the sinking of the General Delgrano,
the credibility of the Royal Navy's submarine threat was ensured.
Low submarine weapon utility against close inshore, small, and shallow draft
targets is a legitimate weakness. Technology is improving submarine weapons
capability, but the result will rarely be as cost effective as that of the aircraft's
bomb or the surface ship's naval gun. As the commanding officer of one submarine
has stated:
It has been said that there are only two kinds of ships in any navy--
submarines and targets. But this submariner would be the first to agree that
there are many things that "targets" --not to mention aircraft- -have always
done better than any submarine. [Ref. 32]
IV. THE CASE FOR SUBMARINE DIPLOMACY
A. INTRODUCTION
Vice-Admiral Bruce DeMars, U.S. Navy, at the time Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Submarines (OP-02), has spelled out the requirements for an







The following is a review of these attributes with emphasis on their potential
contribution to a role for submarines in naval diplomacy.
E. SUBMARINE ADVANTAGES
1 . Stealth
"Remain undetected" --this order is given with confidence to only two
types of naval forces: the submarine force and hit-and-run amphibious landing
parties. For these forces this order is standard operating procedure, meaning that
only when infrequently not in effect is stipulation required.
The stealth of the submarine provides the NCA with inherent platform
flexibility. The SSN can be dispatched to a problem area early without influencing
delicate dip] gotiations or raising tensions by provocation. If the
situation calms without intervention, the SSN can be withdrawn just as stealthily
[Ref. 29]. The stealth factor also provides a great uncertainty to the opposing
forces. Were SSNs in the area before or after the NCA announcement? There may
have been a SPIN declaration, but perhaps not. If not, the party to be deterred
must consider the possible presence of one or more submarines, either
independently or in support of a surface task grouping. In all cases, a high degree
of uncertainty is introduced into opposition calculations. Stealth is a significant
contributor to the psychological aspects of submarine warfare.
Stealthy platform flexibility allows the NCA a wide range of options.
The "sinister" combination of the submarine-commando team was recognized by
Cable as one way that submarines might serve as an instrument of gunboat
diplomacy after all:
Even the submarine might come into its own for specialized operations--
landing a small party inperceived [sic] by night to kidnap or rescue a leader.
. . .[Ref. 3:p. 94]
Another example is the British use of SSNs for intelligence-gathering
purposes after the Argentine Navy had retreated into port [Ref. 23:p. 126]. The
British SSNs were able to detect sorties of the Argentine Air Force at take-off and
provide tactical warning to the Task Force vessels and landing-zones 400 nautical
miles tc the east. Submarines simply provide a means of performing several
conventional tasks of naval diplomacy surreptitiously.
2. Mobility
Nuclear power has tremendously improved strategic mobility of certain
naval forces. This is equally true for the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier as it
is for the submarine. But the nuclear endurance of surface combatants is offset
I
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th m • ' f r replenishment of various consumables. SSNs, on the other hand,
can deliver "impressive, sustained high speed," and "freedom from the impact of
weather and sea conditions," which affect all surface ships [Ref. 29]. As the
Falkland crisis demonstrated, it is entirely possible that the SSN will be the first
unit to arrive on the scene; and, as previously discussed, the U.S. Navy's Maritime
Strategy requires this.
Tactically, the combination of the SSN's high submerged mobility and
stealth allows repositioning for detection-avoidance and repeated optimum
attacks. The HMS Conqueror's successful use of low-tech World War II torpedoes
was afforded by the mobility-stealth combination [Ref. 29:p. 38].
3. Firepower
The submariner's first thought about weapons employment against a
target is the number required for a kill. The number of torpedoes or missiles is
usually quite low (on the order of one or two) and is testimony to the lethality of
the weapons. The conventional weapons mix presently available to U.S. attack
submarines includes: the Mark 4S torpedo (anti-ship and anti-submarine),
Harpoon missile (anti-ship), Tomaha wk cruise missile (anti-ship and land attack
variants), a variety of naval mines, and various commando units. But, as already
discussed, these weapons, with the exception of raiding parties, can be criticized
for their lack of proportionality .
The Tomahawk sea launched cruise missile (SLCM) launched from
submarines has done as much to change the war fighting implications of
submarines as did nuclear power 30 years ago. The land attack variant in
particular has provided submarines with the conventional means to project power
far ashore. This power projection capability, be it overt (surface ships) or covert
(submarines) can be a powerful deterrent The SI,CM has ex non-
submariners in the Navy, with some going as far as to characterize SLCM-capable
SSNs as the future aircraft carrier:
SSNs can launch Tomahawks at an enemy's homeland targets virtually at
will. Two or more SSNs can concentrate this kind of force. A submarine's
Tomahawks can neutralize air defenses for follow on carrier air attacks.
Submarine launched Tomahawks can create a diversion far from the main
point of attack. [Ref. 34]
Used sparingly and against clearly defined targets, can the SLCM be a
proportional weapon of gunboat diplomacy? The answer must be affirmative on the
same grounds that Cable considered the U.S. bombing of Libyan targets during
March and April 198C as a legitimate act of gunboat diplomacy [Ref. 17:p. 40].
4. Endurance
The SSN's limited need for replenishment and hence high on-station
endurance adds to the submarine's potential value as a naval diplomatic tool. An
on-station SSN need not retire to a rear area to periodically refuel and to thereby
weaken the patrolling force. On-station time is maximized and relief can be
accomplished surreptitiously by another SSN. At no time can the opposition
estimate the amount of endurance remaining for the on-station SST*. This
complicates potential opposition planning, as there are no evolutions to observe,
and no discernable schedule cr logistics weaknesses to exploit.
5. Survivability
The basis of submarine survivability is the medium in which it operates.
Submarine survivability offers exploitable advantages:
The water medium provides the greatest protection and concealment. It has
the least ranges for detection. It offers the greatest shielding of radiations.
And it causes the greatest span of time for tactical actions. In today's
environment of electronics, very high speed systems, and precision weaponry
of great damaging power, the need for covert operations and surprise in
attack become paramount, and submarines offer a high degree A' both.
[Ref. 3o|
Unlike surface combatants, the submarine requires no defenses against anti-ship
missiles other than to remain submerged [Ref. 36]. Thus, the SSN can perform a
significant number of naval diplomacy roles without subjection to the ASM threat
that has become a growing concern for surface ships, merchant and combatant
alike.
6. Effectiveness
Much has been said about the effectiveness of the SSN in the ASW role.
This fact is underscored by its role in the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy. The
effectiveness of the SSN in gunboat diplomacy is a lesser known quantity.
Elsewhere in this paper, case studies of the use of submarines in naval diplomacy
will illuminate this aspect, but it must be conceded that, given the absence of
major institutional supporters, the "evidence" has little chance to be judged on its
own merits. Phenomena that cannot be fully explained by an established paradigm
are rarely recognized, by the paradigm's advocates, or are dismissed as
"anomalies," i.e. exceptions-to-the-rule [Ref. 37]. This means that the
effectiveness of submarine diplomacy can only be fairlyjudged against the criteria
of a different naval diplomacy paradigm, i.e. one that recognizes at least the
principle of submerged na\ al diplomacy.
C. DISCUSSION
An important distinction must be clarified before proceeding. Surface
combatants are recognized as the tools par excellencefor naval diplomacy because
they are "credible platforms." They are credible because they have been used in
the past. If warships had never fired a shot, short of war, it would not matter that
they are visible--they u ould not be credible for diplomacy purposes. The victim
would look to sea in the diplomatic situation and see only grey ships, and he would
not worry. This would parallel the position of the submarine prior to the 1982
Falklands conflict. Until that time submarines were perceived as weapons useful
only in war. Uninformed opinion still views submarines in this manner. A detailed
discussion of the Falkland crisis follows in a later chapter, but it warrants
mention that British submarine activities bore no resemblance to open warfare.
Yet, the threat from the unseen submarine became suddenly credible after the
sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano.
The point is that demonstrated capability and the political will to use limited
naval force must exist before that force can become a credible threat. For this
reason much of this thesis centers on violent acts that have the possibility of
"provoking the victim into starting' a war [Ref. 3:p. 08], The demonstrated
capability to conduct violent operations, within naval diplomatic limits, must
precede acceptance of the submarine as a coercive capability below the threshold
of "mi ar-fighting" violence. If submarine diplomacy obtains credibility, the party
to be deterred will look toward an apparently empty sea and worry about
submarines in situations short of war. Without credibility, an empty sea causes
no worrj .
In the pas:, acknowledgement that submarines have (or may have) been
participants in U.S. naval "presence" operations, has usually come long after the
fact. Such admissions have commonly come to light during Congressional
testimony, and were rarely aimed at improving the credibility of U.S. naval
diplomacy. Instead, they have usually been cited in passing and in support of
naval force structure and funding debates. If an intended side benefit of these
releases of information is to improve the credibility of a U.S. coercive naval
presence by suggesting that submarines are always present in such naval
formations, it lacks appropriate timing and volume--it is a poor method of
communication, for the signal has been too weak to be heard except by the
strongest receivers. The latter are, of course, very important, but others may miss
this weak signal completely. In naval diplomacy, communication must be simple
and clear to be effective.
The open literature on naval diplomacy commonly discusses the various types
of forces involved, but rarely are submarines mentioned. This could be for two
reasons. The first is that submarines have simply not been involved on a wide
scale. This would imply that there is a general sense that submarines are somehow
unsuited for such missions. This thesis argues that there is no such international
consensus. A consensus implies communication or a tacit understanding. It is
extremely doubtful that there is international dialogue on this subject, however,
a tacit understanding could become institutionalized in practice.
The second reason could be that the participation of submarines in naval
diplomacy is a more prevalent occurrence than is reported in fact. In this case,
military considerations (possibly reserving a diplomatic or war-fighting
submarine capability for when it is seriously needed) have perhaps outweighed
calculations of short-term diplomatic value. Or, it could simply be that submarine
involvement has been solely restricted to defense of the surface combatants
involved, and not intended for any coercive diplomatic value whatsoever. This
latter view is plausible if it is judged that the (defensive) deterrent value of the
escorting SS\' requires no explicit advertisement. In effect, the assumption is that
the opposition assumes that SSTJs are defending a "shou-of-forco" battle group.
These reasons complement each other nicely. If, in fact, submarines have
been routinely involved in naval diplomacy, their nature makes denial easily
plausible. Thus, the security factor of the second reason builds on the perceived
consensus implied by the first. If there were a "conspiracy" to deny the true value
of submarines in naval diplomacy so as to capitalize on the shock value of their
eventual use (or any other potential benefit), the framing assumptions could not
be any better. This is not an attempt to construct a case of conspiracy; however,
it does suggest that any ulterior motives (bureaucratic, organizational, or
strategic) could be easily masked.
An example of this phenomena was suggested to the author by Bradford
Dismukes [Ref. 38]. He revealed that the ground rules for unclassified publication
of his book (co-edited with McConnell), Soviet Naval Diplomacy, included a
stipulation that no mention of Soviet submarines was allowed other than those
observed operating on the surface or conducting port visits. Thus, for "security
most armchaij analysts have been kept in the dark as to the operational
clues of Soviet submarine behavior that may have been available to task force
commanders and the NCA. This is not a fault in itself, for security concerns are
certainly legitimate. The problem lies when these "uncleared" or uninformed
armchair analysts postulate and publish that the submarine diplomatic, deterrent
contribution is essentially meaningless because submarines are not "visible" to
then, and therefore lack diplomatic credibility .
Admiral Mckee's first axiom of submarine warfare is: Remain undetected [Ref.
28:p. 11]. These two words form the basis of the submarine force organizational
essence. The inculcation of this axiom is very deep. It is imbedded in the
submariner s professional training from moment he is first submerged. The
suggestion of intentionally informing a potentially hostile naval force of the
location of a submarine is taboo. This is a professional dictum of the highest order
for today's naval leadership and is a "rule" that will be slow to change. To the
submariner, the Submarine Presence and Intent Notice (SPIN) is an utterly
ridiculous (and scary) suggestion.
If submarines are to engage in naval diplomacy, their presence must,
somehow, be let known to the intended audience. The SPIN meets this requirement,
but some would say that it places the submarine at unnecessary risk. A
compromise can be found; the trade-off between submarine tactical advantage and
coercive diplomatic utility can be bounded.
The submariner takes professional pride in his ability to avoid detection.
The suggestion that a submarine placed in the area with a radium of, say, 200
nautical miles (nm.), could not avoid detection, would irritate the professional
submariner. He ivould quickly point out that the area covered by such a circle
would encompass ovei 125,000 urn. square, and that localization by even the
largest and best ASW force, would be a formidable, though not an insurmountable
task. But what about a 100 nm. radius equating to an area of over 31,000 nm.
square? While it is recognized that this argument is extremely simplistic, the
point to be made nevertheless is that "it all depends"-- depending on such factors
as location, the potential opponent's counter-capabilities, and most important,
the diplomatic stake involved. A compromise between the demands of diplomatic
"visibility" an tactical security can probably be found.
Another widely held institutional bias is that the submarine is a "capital"
ship, designed, optimized, and reserved for general war. This view is bolstered by
th< further argument that the U,S. Navy submarine force level is barely adequate
to carry out assigned wartime missions, let alone take on the added responsibility
of crisis diplomacy. Moreover, the SSN has a qualitative advantage over the
surface ship in the performance of ASW, while a cursory glance at SSNs suggests
unsuitability in naval diplomacy. With these two "givens," a corollary to the
"capital" ship argument emerges: naval diplomacy roles should only be performed
by surface combatants and the carrier air wings. These arguments do not take into
account that the changing warfare environment may be placing the surface ship
at unnecessary risk
,
or the consideration that roughly thirty five percent of U.S.
combatants are SSNs [Ref. 25:p. 5], or that possibly there could be too few surface
combatants to fill every naval diplomacy role along with other commitments.
The threat environment of naval diplomacy has changed drastically from 1
5
or even 10 years ago. The Falklands Conflict, the Gulf of Sidra "Line of Death,"
Operation Praying Mantis, the SiarATneident [Ref. 39] and the Vincenneslncldenl[Ref. 40]
all indicate that the low-intensity conflict at sea will have mid -intensity
overtones. Surface forces will continue as the main component of naval diplomacy
and inevitably, tragedies like the Stark and Vincennes incidents will also
continue. Surface forces in naval diplomacy must react faster, less proportionally,
and sometimes prematurely in the face of the ASM equipped Third World naval
forces. This must be so for self protection. Can the potential gains of modern
naval diplomacy balance with the increased risk posed to contemporary surface
forces? Can the potential uncertainties of self protection balance with naval
diplomacy's gains? Currently, these balances are unstable, and shifts are
inevitable. Third World navies are growing with respect to anti-ship missile and
submarine capability [Ref. 41]. "Some twenty-one Third World countries
collectively possess more than 250 submarines . . . in selected missions, such as
regional straits defense or SLOC interdiction, such forces could prove militarily
significant even against a more capable naval power." [Ref. 421 What is the best
naval asset to counter the Third World submarine? Perhaps, the submarine is
being "forced" into naval diplomacy, despite its shortcomings.
D. CONCLUSION
Submarines in naval diplomacy have their limitations. The opponent must
have some assets that submarines can hold at risk: a merchant fleet, naval
combatants, or appropriate Tomahawk targets. If the political objective can be
more easily accomplished with aircraft or surface combatants, then submarines
are, obviously, not the preferred choice of the NCA. But if surface combatants or
aircraft are placed at unacceptable risk, or if surface combatants or the aircraft
carrier cannot arrive before a deterrent presence or a violent response is required,
a submarine may be required to fill the coercive naval diplomacy role. One hopes,
that before this situation arrives the coercive threat of the submarine is credible,
lest expediency require violence to establish credibility.
The use of violent force to establish credibility need only be a
demonstration, thus the remaining assets are held hostage to the coercive
presence. Examples of such demonstrations would be: sinking one ship to
demonstrate and threaten that all the opponents ship's can be sunk, or the use of
a submarine launched SLCM to destroy a discrete land target to demonstrate and
threaten that all such targets can be destroyed. The submarine and land-attack
SLCM provide a covert platform that is possibly more proportional than a carrier
air strike. Once credibility is established the submarine can make a contribution
to the limited naval force of coercive diplomacy by its presence --at levels belou
violence. The biggest limitation, by far, is the "visibility" problem. Once the
"visibility" problem is resolved to the satisfaction of the parties involved, most
opposition to a role for submarines in naval diplomacy will be muted, despite the
submarine's limitations.
The Submarine Presence and Intent Notice (SPIN) is only one means of
providing that visibility. Other methods compromise the integrity of submarine
tactical advantage, perhaps dangerously. The following chapter consists of a
series of case studies involving the use of submarines in apparent naval-
diplomatic circumstances. The questions of interest raised by theses cases are the
following:
• Why were submarines used?
• How was the submarine presence conveyed, if applicable?
• How was submarine force used?
• What were the ramifications and outcome of submarine use?
If these questions can be answered, perhaps a greater understanding of past
submarine diplomacy can be applied to its future use.
V. CASE STUDIES OF THE USE OF SUBMARINES IN NAVAL DIPLOMACY
A. INTRODUCTION
The following case studies are provided to support the proposition that
submarines have participated in naval diplomacy on more numerous occasions than
the literature frequently implies. The case studies presented include: the Spanish
Civil War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli
Wars, the 1970 Jordanian Crisis, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani Crisis, and the 1982
Falklands Conflict. This effort is by no means a complete compilation, nor are all
the facts known in the cases presented. However, enough is known to suggest that
submarines have enjoyed some success in the naval diplomatic arena. The case
study method is a less rigorous methodology than others, however, it is not
intended to prove that submarines are a useful naval diplomacy platform. Case
studies allow presentation of pertinent information to support arguments and
positions. This implies, of course, that it is possible to construct a case study to
support any argument or position. An example of misconstruction is found in what
is perhaps the earliest incident of submarine diplomacy. 9 James Cable cited this
first case of submarine diplomacy as follows.
On 20 October [1927] the British Submarine L4 sank a Chinese pirate ship
in Chinese territorial waters. In the subsequent protest the Chinese
Government complained, inter alia, that excessive force had been used and
that some of the victims of the Pirates had perished together with the latter.
This illustrates the relative clumsiness of the submarine as an instrument
of naval diplomacy. [Ref. 3:p. 204]
9 This, of course, excludes the latent political ramifications .-I German and
Austria-Hungarian unrestricted submarine warfare activities which, arguably,
.•. • i a contributing cause of U.S. entry into World Wa] i.
It is unfortunate that this passage misrepresents the truth. Cable's research
source for this information, The China Yearbook 1929-30, reveals that the L4 was
operating on the surface and sank the S.S. Irene by firing "five or six solid shots
and explosive shells into her [with the deck gun] at approximately 300 yards
range." [Ref. 43] Cable's indictment of submarines is illogical as the commanding
officer's "clumsy" decision to fire would have been performed no differently had
the L4 been a destroyer.
B. SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-39
A prelude to the conflagration of World War II, the Spanish Civil War provided
many glimpses of what was to come. Perhaps one of its most foreboding aspects
was the technological advancements and application of aerial strategic bombing
on civilian urban targets as the air power doctrine of Douhet had predicted. Since
the Spanish Civil War was immediately followed by the Second World War, its
historical importance has paled in comparison. Thus, the circumstances of
clandestine submarine warfare conducted by non-belligerent nations is not well
known.
Both the Nationalist and Republican forces had submarines at their disposal,
and both utilized foreign submariners. The officer corps of the Republican
submarine force was decimated by defections and executions, eventually
Republican submarines were "commanded by Soviet captains overseen by Spanish
political commissars." [Ref. 44:p. 6] Italy overtly provided Franco's rebel
Nationalists with a total of six submarines. Two were transferred to the Spanish
Nationalists, four more were considered "Legionary" submarines under the Spanish
Nationalist flag, but, manned by "volunteer" Italian officers and crews.
Additionally, Mussolini covertly employed his large submarine force to augment
the Nationalist force with instructions to fly the Spanish flag if forced to surface.
[Ref. 44]
Germany briefly contributed two submarines to covert support of the
Nationalist cause, between 21 November and 20 December 1936. U-34 sank the
Republican submarine C-3 on 12 December without being identified [Ref. 45] This
contrasts with German aviation personnel and aircraft contributing to the
Nationalist cause throughout the war. Mussolini also contributed 60,000 troops
to the cause of Franco [Ref. 46].
German and Italian submarines covertly participated in campaigns against
shipping bound for Spanish Republican forces. The "unknown submarines" sank
shipping of various nationalities throughout the Mediterranean, but the tactic was
designed to specifically deter Soviet aid. The identification of the "unknown
submarines" became known circumstantially, first by torpedo fragments, then
whole torpedoes were found beached and unexploded, and eventually
,
inadvertent
tactical exposure. "The total results of 108 [110 including German] clandestine
combat patrols were only 6 merchant vessels [and 1 submarine] sunk and I cruiser
and 1 destroyer damaged." [Ref. 45:p. 97]
The sinkings were successful in considerably reducing aid and prompting
Soviet second-thoughts [Ref. 46:p. 5], but they stopped when the British informed
the Italians that submerged submarines in patrol zones would become legitimate
targets as authorized by the 17 September 1937 Nyon Arrangement. Italy, seeking
plausible deniability, chose the "unknown submarine" tactic because it did not
..;. h to be ostracized by other European powers for siding against the Spanish
Republican! and did not fee. that the submarines would bt opposed. It.al.s
eventually ceased the submarine campaign and joined the powers enforcing the
"international agreement for collective measures against piratical attacks in the
Mediterranean by submarines." [Ref. 3:p. 216, and Ref. 46:p. 6]
In summary, Italian (and initially German) submarines were used in a covert
manner to support the rebel Nationalist forces; this provided plausible deniability
for the non-belligerent nations. The submarine presence was not conveyed until
the time of attack; the presence of "legal" combatant submarines complemented
this tactic. By sinking shipping bound for Republican ports, including two Soviet
merchant ships, the "unknown submarines" were able to deter Soviet assistance,
since the Soviets were unable or unwilling to protect their merchants by deploying
naval combatants in the Mediterranean. As a result of the purposeful sinking of
neutral shipping, the acts were labeled as "piracy" and provoked an international
agreement on the collective use of force to combat the "unknown submarine"
menace. Howevei , with rising nationalism in the Third World and the proliferation
of advanced submarines to Third World nations a recurrence of a clandestine
surrogate submarine campaign should not be discounted as a future possibility.
C. CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962
The 19C2 Cuban .Missile Crisis demands periodic "re-studying." With time,
and thanks to the gradual de-classification of pertinent documents, additional
and finer-grained information is becoming accessible about who exactly knew
what and when at the time. Most reconstructions of events, however, are
concerned with the crisis' /mo/ear dimension. By contrast, comparatively little is
known in the public domain on the underwater aspects of the superpower stand-
off. The best treatment of Soviet submarine activities during the missile crisis
that has been found by this author is Johns' The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962
[Ref. 47J.
According to Johns there were six positive Soviet submarine contacts in the
vicinity of Cuba during the period of crisis. 1 ° The first, a ZULU-class submarine,
was observed on the surface during a mid-Atlantic refueling from a TEREK-class
submarine support ship on 22 October, before President Kennedy's quarantine
announcement that evening. There has been some speculation that submarines
were being used to transfer the nuclear warheads [Ref. 48]. The ZULU apparently
directly returned to a northern Soviet port without becoming involved with the
U.S. quarantine. All subsequent positive submarine contacts resulted after the
imposition of the quarantine at 1000R 24 October. 1 1 [Ref. 47: pp. 147-8]
Robert Kennedy mentions the ZULU in his account of the missile crisis,
Thirteen Days [Ref. 49]. Although, it was later proven that the ZLrLf/headed north,
he asserts that it was headed toward Cuba [Ref. 49: pp. 61-2]. This perceived
1
° "Submarine contacts are divided into three primary categories depending on





possible . A submarine contact can only be classified positive when all or part of
the submarine is sighted and identified by personnel considered qualified and
competent to identify the portion of the submarine sighted. A probable submarine
is one in which the methods of detection and tracking meet all of certain
promulgated criteria, which generally require that the submarine be tracked for
a minimum time period by at least one equipment and confirmed by a second
technique or equipment. . . A possible submarine is one that may be assigned by
competent personnel to a contact which does not meet the requirements for a
positive or probable but yet possesses sufficient characteristics to prohibit its
being classified a non-submarine." CNO, "Historical Narrative," Appendix 14, as
cited in Johns [Ref. 47].
1 l Times in this section are expressed in the military format as follows: HHMMZ;
where H = hour; M = minute; Z = time zone. There are three time zones of interest:
Zulu (Z) or Greenwich Mean Time is a world wide military standard time, Romeo (R)
is thi ne and is five hours latei than Zulu time, Moscow.
time is in i . > hours before Greenwich and seven ahead of
Washingl on D.C.
tacit submarine threat against the impending quarantine was cause for concern.
According to Kennedy:
The President ordered the Navy to give the highest priority to tracking the
submarines and to put into effect the greatest possible safety measures to
protect our own aircraft carriers and other vessels. |Ref. 49:p. 62]
Kennedy has also reported that, on Wednesday 24 October, just after the
quarantine went into effect, the White House received news from the Navy that a
Soviet submarine was positioning itself between two Sovietmerchants approaching
U.S. Navy warships forming the quarantine line. The President was annoyed that
the first confrontation of the quarantine would be with a Soviet warship--
particularly a submarine. He reportedly wondered, "Isn't there some way we can
avoid having our first exchange with a Russian submarine--almost anything but
that?'' [Ref. 49:p. 70] The aircraft carrier Essex was assigned to make the first
stop since it could signal the submarine to surface with sonar, while shielded by
its own ASW helicopters. This submarine contact was not mentioned again by
Robert Kennedy, because aftei the Soviet merchant ships stopped dead in the
water and turned back a few minutes later, the President issued an operational
hold order to the Navy to prevent provoking the situation. [Ref. 49:p. 09-72]
At this point, according to Elie Abel [Ref. 50], the military chiefs at the
Pentagon suspected and advised the ExComm 1 2 that the Soviet merchants might
be rendezvousing with submarines before attempting a forced penetration of the
quarantine line [Ref. 50:p. 142], Although the rendezvous did not materialize, the
chief's suspicion suggests that they were quite cognizant that the submarine has
... the ad hoc formation of the "Executive Committee" oi the National
Dixie known.
at least the potential to assume a coercive posture below the threshold of actual
violence.
Alexander George [Ref. 51] has opined that Kennedy's account of the crisis
implies that the submarine or submarines were forced to surface (about 1030R)
prior to the merchants turning back, although he notes that this conjecture could
not be substantiated (at the time of his writing, 1971) [Ref. 51 :p. 113]. Johns has
noted that the first "positive" submarine contact after the quarantine had gone
into effect did not occur until 1929Z 24 October or (subtract 5 hours) 1429R--
some hours after the merchant ships stopped and turned back [Ref. 47:p. 147]. It
was located several hundred miles inside the quarantine zone.
Earlier that same morning (1500 Moscow time), Khrushchev scheduled an
impromptu appointment with William Knox, President of Westinghouse
International, a visiting U.S. businessman who became Khrushchev's personal
messenger. According to Abel:
He [Khrushchev] wanted the President and the American People to know,
. . ., that if the United States Navy tried to stop Soviet ships at sea, his
submarines would start sinking American ships. And that would mean a third
world war. [Ref. 50:p. 140]
This information did not become available to the President immediately; Knox
departed Moscow the next day (25 October) and reported to the Administration on
arrival. [Ref. 50:p. 40]
Johns has this to say about Khrushchev's warning: "The U.S. Navy must have
considered his threat tc . . . Knox to sink warships with his submarines as totally
vacuous in view of the extensive U.S. Navy ASW activities in the Western Atlantic
and Caribbean at that time." [Ref. 47:p. 254] This opinion misses the purpose of
Khrushchev s statement. The warning to Knox was made on 24 October, i.e. before
thi full extent of the submarine threat was known by Washington, By the time
Knox's message reached the White House, only two submarines contacts had been
classified "positive." Khrushchev made his coercive comment not for the benefit
of the U.S. Navy, but for the ears of the President. Moreover, the Navy's ASW
harassment activities arguably provided the Soviet submarines with a target-
rich environment, thus potentially enhancing the credibility of Khruschev's
threat.
A FOXTROT- class submarine, pendant no. 945, suffered a severe engineering
casualty that forced her to remain surfaced after 2130Z 30 October; Johns notes
that L'SS Keppler remained in company until the Soviets were able to provide
assistance, some ten days later [Ref. 47:p. 1 48 1 . Scott Sagan asked Robert
McNamara, Secretary of Defense for President Kennedy, during an interview
documented in On the Brink, if he was aware that a Soviet submarine had been
crippled during the Navy's submarine harassmentoperations. After acknowledging
the risk involved in the harassment operations, McNamara conceded that, "We
didn't know at the time that we'd injured a Soviet submarine . . .." [Ref. 48:pp.
61,63]
Cable's claim that the Soviets failed in their effort to use submarines in the
na\ al diplomacy role is relevant only if that had been the Soviets purpose in fact.
Johns makes an excellent case that this simply was not so. All the submarines
were en route or in the quarantine zone prior to President Kennedy's 22 October
announcement. Arguably therefore, their initial tasking was something other than
to serve as a coercive presence. Khrushchev's (belated) acknowledgment that his
country s submarines were indeed in the vicinity can conceivably be construed as
the Soviet Union s one attempt to convert their "latent" coerciveness (at best)
The Zulu-class boat, first observed in the mid- Atlantic, was
not forwarded to the quarantine zone. Two submarines initially located well
within the quarantine zone itself did not move appreciably from point of initial
detection despite near constant harassment. The three other detected submarines
transited eastward or north and left the quarantine zone. All the submarines in
the quarantine zone were conventionally powered. One would suspect that had
coercion been intended, the Soviets would have used their new nuclear-powered
NOVEMBER- class attack submarines. 1 3 And finally, when forced to surface under
harassment, some Soviet submarines complied with surfacing procedures
promulgated by a U.S. Notice to Mariners, evidently relayed by Moscow [Ref. 47:pp.
149-50].
If it is true that the Soviets never did endeavor to use their submarines in
a naval diplomacy role, then it follows that Cable's argument that the Soviets
failed on this count becomes a straw-man. The same applies to Alexander George's
claim that the submarines "were leading arid attempting to shield the merchant
vessels approaching the quarantine line." [Ref. 51:p. 1 12, and Ref. 47:pp. 150-1 j
In truth, submarines happened to be the only naval asset readily available
to Khrushchev for operations in an "out of area" locale as distant as the
Caribbean. It is doubtful that they were dispatched to perforin a ant i-quarantine
naval diplomacy role per se. It is true, of course, that their presence might have
evolved to a coercive one, but that other events preempted this contingency. The
Soviet submarine presence was "signalled" by inadvertent tactical exposures,
which, again suggest that naval diplomacy was not initially intended.
Ascertaining the real purpose of the Soviet submarines remains pure- conjecture,
ording to th< 1962-6! edition of Jane's Fighting Shipsthe Soviet Navy
had four opi rationa . >', class attack submarine.-.
but the implications of their perceived purpose are easily seen: the U.S. Navy
embarked on an extensive ASW campaign to try and neutralize the submarines
perceived coercive potential. Moreover, regardless of whether Khrushchev
intended to use the submarines dispatched as a diplomatic "signal," clearly
President Kennedy appears to have appreciated the Navy's ASW campaign as much
as a political message as a tactical counter.
D. SUPERPOWER NAVAL STANDOFFS 1967-1973
Unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, submarines were not a specific focus in the
course of the superpower naval standoffs during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli
wars. The major literature on these events only mentions submarine involvement
in passing, in part perhaps for reasons of security classification (Ref. 38].
However, the lack of literary attention does not necessarily mean submarines did
not influence events.
1. June 1967 Arab-Israeli War
The Mediterranean in the post World War II period has been a fertile
theater for coercive use of naval power. At least two instances prior to the 1967
war suggest that the Arab world was sensith e to the naval diplomatic potential
of submarines. During the 1957 Syrian-Turkish crisis, the Soviet Navy made its
first port visit to a Third World country, i.e. Syria. The Egyptian press, making the
most of the Soviet gesture on behalf of the Arab cause, inflated the size of the
Soviet flotilla from a cruiser and a destroyer to "a cruiser, three destroyers and
several submarines equipped with guided missiles." (emphasis added) [Ref. 52)
The next year, the Egyptian press again raised the specter of a Soviet naval show
of force in the wake of the U.S. intervention in Lebanon. Dismukes and McConnell
have reported:
In late June an Egyptian press headline had declared: "Russian Submarines
in Albania Supplied with Atomic Missiles." In fact, there were no submarines
in Albania at the time; they came there in August—of course, without
missiles--only after the crisis was over, a week after the U.S. had already
begun withdrawing marines from Lebanon; and they came unannounced either
by Moscow or the Arabs. [Ref. 52:p. 246, as cited in Ref. 4:p. 11]
These press headlines indicate two things: first, that the Egyptians
expected that submarines would be at the heart of a Soviet naval coercive effort
in the Mediterranean, and, secondly that, from the Egyptian point of view,
submarines, or at least Soviet submarines possess a coercive value. Given that
submarines are the Soviet Navy's "capital ships," it stands to reason that the
latter will have an inordinately high "visibility" in the Soviet practice of naval
diplomacy.
Maximum Soviet submarine strength during the June 1967 war was ten;
some reports cite a number, as high as twelve [Ref. 53]. Unlike later "routine"
deployments of several cruise missile submarines, only one cruise missile
submarine was evidently involved, along with one nuclear-powered and eight
conventionally-powered attack submarines. The submarine strength of the
Eskadra was significantly greater than reported in the U.S. press which only
reported two or three Soviet submarines [Ref. 53:p. 49n]. These 10 submarines
were complemented by a maximum surface combatant strength of 27, including 10
destroyer-size or larger ships. Thus, the submarines amounted to 27 percent of
the total combatant force, but as much as 50 percent of the major combatant force.
During the Six Day war neither the Soviet Fifth Eskadra, nor the U.S.
Sixth Fleet was reinforced, although the Soviets could have drawn on their
relatively large (33 major surface combatants) pool of Black Sea combatants. The
1967 stand-off marks the first occasion that Soviet naval power was concentrated
for explicitly diplomatic purposes, and although weak in relation to the two
opposing U.S. carrier battle groups, the Eskadra "was strong enough to have
political impact." [Ref. 4:pp. 160-1,168]
In summary, submarines were used as an integral part of the Eskadra's
purpose of deterring Sixth Fleet intervention to the detriment of the Egyptian or
Syrian states. Their presence was presumably conveyed through tactical and
intelligence means. Also, this event marks the introduction of the now familiar
Soviet Anti-Carrier Warfare (ACW) groups which usually include submarines.
2. September 1970 Jordanian Crisis
Soviet objectives during the Jordanian Crisis appear to have been very
similar to those in the June 1967 war. The most important task of the Soviet Fifth
Eskadra was to deter active intervention by the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The Eskadra
grew in size from 47 to 60 total ships, and the number of major surface combatants
rose fruit, eighl to iu. A total of about 14 Soviet submarines was involved,
including four cruise missile submarines, of which two arrived the first week in
October to reinforce the normal complement of two. Thus, submarines were 23
percent of the total force and, again, roughly GO percent of its major cumbatant
complement. It is possible that two missile submarines left the Mediterranean at
the end of their normal deployments. Had the retention or release of these
submarines been made clear, a plain signal indicating the degree of Soviet resolve
would have been made. Such a signal was made during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
[Ref. 4:pt. 171-2]
One difference between this period of heightened Mediterranean tension
and tilt 1967 war. * as that regular Fifth Eskadra ACW exercises had been
conducted the previous two years so that these formations had become easily-
recognizable to the Sixth Fleet. When a third U.S. carrier was ordered to the
Mediterranean, the Soviet's advanced beyond "tattletale" tactics and positioned
ACW groups near the U.S. carriers. Stephen S. Roberts explains:
In the ordinary configuration of a Soviet ACW group a destroyer or frigate
would remain within a few miles of a U.S. carrier, while a cruiser armed with
surface-to-surface cruise missiles (SSMs) would remain at a greater distance
from but near, if not within, firing range of the carrier. (Gun cruisers are
sometimes substituted for SSM cruisers, probably due to operational
necessity. The cruiser is sometimes escorted by a SAM [surface-to-air
missile] destroyer.) An invisible component of the ACW group, consisting of
an SSM submarine of the Echo-ll, Juliett, or Charlie classes, and one or more
torpedo attack submarines is also presumably in the area--although, once
again, not necessarily within range. [Ref. 4:p. 173]
Roberts understood that the submarines were the major deterrent force in these
Soviet tactical groupings. He makes this point and then continues the discussion
with examples of Soviet diplomatic signaling with submarines:
Although the Soviets relied on the movements of their major surface
combatants to provide ACW forces with their potential for diplomatic impact,
the principal striking powei of these groups clearly lay in their submarine
component. Normally, the Sov ieis do not intentionally reveal the position of
their submarines during crises. However, for a period of over two weeks
during the Jordanian crisis, a Juliett- class SSM submarine operated on the
surface. During seven days of this period it was accompanied by two
surfaced Foxtrot-class torpedo-attack submarines. This action came ab the
crisis ashore was winding down. It may well be that the surfaced operations
of these submarines reflected an unusual attempt by the Soviets to reduce
the "threat" posed by the Fifth Eskadra by making its submarines more
vulnerable. While it is less likely, the action may also have been the result
of operational difficulties experienced by the Juliett. [Ref. 4:p. 173]
Not knowing the details of the surfaced Juliett movements in relation
to the U.S. carrier battle groups, Roberts must be taken at his word that this was
a signal of reduced threat. Both the Juliett and Echo classes of cruise missile
submarines arc required to surface before firing their missiles, thus the surface
operations ma;. ha\ e served to reduce the time required for weapons employment.
Deployed in this fashion an SSM submarine is little different from a
"conventional," i.e. surface SSM combatant. Also, this series of superpowei
standoffs suggest that naval tensions do not unwind immediately in parallel with
relaxation in tensions ashore, but that instead a significant lag factor appears
involved.
A larger point must be made. Tactical intelligence provides the CBG
commander with information about the submarine threat. Thus, submarine
presence, normally a tactical concern, bolsters the diplomatic impact of surface
combatants. If submarines are supporting surface ships conducting a diplomatic
role, then a prima facie case exists that submarines are performing a diplomatic
role. In what has become a standard pattern, a portion of the Soviet submarines
involved in exercises and other diplomatic shows of force, routinely surface for
prolonged periods and/or subsequently make highly visible port calls to friendly
nations in the vicinity. This exposure is tactically unnecessary, arid can
therefore be assumed to have some diplomatic meaning. Even if surface operations
are intended to no more than to convey a relaxation of tensions, they clearly
highlight the fact that submarines are participants in coercive diplomatic
situations. In peacetime, the general public are usually ignorant of the
whereabouts of submarines, come crisis, the Soviet Union appears to have gone out
..ay to raise public awareness.
3. December 1971 Indo-Pakistani Crisis
This episode is interesting because it is one of the few naval diplomatic
events in recent history in which a U.S. submarine is known to have participated.
However, all references to the involvement of USS Scamp found by the author are
limited to the 1972 Congressional testimony of Admiral Rickover concerning
funding for nucleai -pow ered surface ships [Ref. 54]. According to Rickover, Scamp
and the aircraft carrier Enterprisewere the only nuclear powered warships in Task
Force 74. 14 This statement was obviously not meant for timely deterrent value,
and was evidently not intended to signal that future opponents should include the
presence of U.S. submarines in their crisis calculations.
The initial Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean prior to the crisis was
true to the established pattern. A single Foxtrot-class torpedo-attack submarine
amounted to 25 percent of the overall Soviet naval combatant presence, and 50
percent of the major combatants--the only other being a gun destroyer. The
Soviets reinforced this presence with two separate ACW groups from the Pacific
Fleet. The maximum strength of the Soviet major combatant force was reached in
early January, and included five destroyers or larger surface combatants and six
submarines, two of which were SSM equipped. Therefore, just over one-half of the
major combatant contingent entailed submarines when the naval response was at
full strength. [Ref. 4: pp. 179-80]
4. October 1973 Arab-Israeli War
The initial Soviet Fifth Eskadra force level was about 60 ships, again
with submarines adding up to 25 percent of the total and approximately 50 percent
of the major combatants. A peak strength of 22 major surface combatants occurred
between 31 October and 4 November. The submarine level rose from 1G to a
maximum of 23 on 31 October, when the units that were normally scheduled to
return home were reinforced by a Northern Fleet relief flotilla [Ref. 55], i.e. "the
relieving force became reinforcements.'' [Ref. 4:p. 194] Again, at its peak, there
was an even balance between major surface combatants and submarines, 22 vs. 23.
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According to Zumwalt [Ref. 55:pp 3G0-7] the purpose of Task Force 74 was to
d. monstrate a U.S. policy "tilted" toward Pakistan.
Roberts has attempted to break down the Soviet surface composition
according to different war missions. He listed: AGI (intelligence gathering), Anti-
USN, Resupply of Egypt, and Resupply of Syria. The peak number of surface
combatants that Roberts attributed to the Anti-USN mission came to 15. Since
submarines do not readily lend themselves to resupply or the AGI roles, it can be
assumed that all 23 units were performing Anti-USN duties. If these numbers are
true, then the different U.S. carrier and amphibious task forces faced more
submarines than surface combatants, with submarines providing 60 percent of the
major ACW combatants. [Ref. 4:pp. 208-9]
Given this high profile of the submarine involvement in cases of Soviet
naval diplomacy, it is easy to see why Roberts challenged Cable's view that
submarines are "inherently ill-suited" for this role [see chapter 2, page 11].
Perhaps this is the best place to conclude Roberts argument with this quotation:
Though this [Cable's] proposition may well apply to the days when
submarines operated alone or in wolfpacks, it has questionable application
to the modern Soviet Navy whose submarines, with vastly more powerful
armament, are employed as an integral— indeed the Soviets say "leading"-
-component of their tactical groupings. Moreover, the image of "a graduated
ladder of violence" [Ref. 3:p. 152] as a means of signalling intention was
relevant to the past (and may remain relevant in other contexts today), but
seems of uncertain relevance to U.S. -Soviet naval confrontations in the era
of the "battle of the first salvo." [Ref. 4:p 212n]
Roughly 50 percent of the major naval combatants deployed by the
Soviets in recent periods of international crisis has been submarines. If
submarines are only meant to bolster the position of Soviet surface combatants
conducting coercive diplomacy, then--by extension— submarines are fulfilling
a naval diplomacy role. Submarine presence is conveyed by intelligence and
tactically for the naval audience, and for professional reiteration and the public,
by periods of surface operations and/ or port visits. Submarine force was utilized
integral to ACW groups by the presence of surface ACW group components and
actual submarine participation in ACW exercises, sometimes with U.S. carriers as
targets. One benefit of Soviet submarine use have been that more uncertainty
has been introduced into the protection of U.S. naval formations. Political
repercussions of submarine use for the Soviets have yet to be identified.
E. FALKLAND ISLAND CRISIS, 1982
On 2 April, 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. The British
military response was unexpected. After the Islands had been retaken, the
question was asked in Great Britain whether the Government had acted
appropriately prior to the invasion. A Committee of Privy Counsellors was
commissioned to investigate and report to Parliament. The product was the
Falkland Islands Review, chaired by the Rt. Hon. The Lord Franks, hereafter
referred to as the Franks Report (Ref. 56].
The British SSN, HMS Spartan, received orders on 29 March to deploy to the
South Atlantic to "support" the Royal Navy ice patrol ship HMS Endurance at South
Georgia. Spartan departed on 31 March. Another SSN, HMS Splendid, received
orders for South Atlantic deployment on 30 March, and departed on 1 April. A
third SSN, HMS Conqueror, was earmarked for deployment, but had final orders
withheld pending developments, on 30 March. British intelligence first received
positive intelligence on Argentine invasion preparations on 31 March. Three SSNs
were given some type of tasking in direct response to a diploma tic situation prior
to it becoming a military situation. This sequence amounts to a clear indication
that the Royal Navy and the British Government foresaw a naval diplomatic role
for the submarine. HMS Conqueror departed for patrol on 4 April. (Ref. 56:pp.61-
4]
The Ministry of Defence's first suggestion to Prime Minister Thatcher's office
of the diplomatic use of submarines occurred on 26 March in a note that included:
... a passage discussing the possibility, at the outset of a period of rising
tension with the prospect of Argentine military action against the Falklands,
of deploying a nuclear-powered submarine to the region, either covertly or
overtly as a deterrent pending the arrival of further naval reinforcements.
[Ref. 56:p. 59)
This was not a novel event. Nearly five years earlier, in late 1977, indications of
possible Argentine hostile intent prompted the British to,
. . . buttress the Government's negotiating position by deploying a force
of sufficient strength, available if necessary, to convince the Argentines
that military action by them would meet resistance. Such a force would not
be able to deal with a determined Argentine attack, but it would be able to
respond flexibly to limited acts of aggression. The Committee agreed that
secrecy should be maintained about the purpose of the force. One nuclear-
powered submarine and two frigates were deployed to the area, the submarine
to the immediate vicinity of the Islands with the frigates standing off about
a thousand miles away. Rules of engagement were drawn up. [Ref. 56:p. 18]
On 5 March 1 982, Lord Carrington, then Great Britain's Foreign Minister, was
informed of this action by the previous Labour Government. He inquired whether
the Argentines had been aware of the 1977 deployment, and when told they had
not, did not pursue the matter. No recommendation to investigate a similar
response resulted from this discussion. When later interviewed about this
discussion, Lord Carrington took the view that the covert nature of the 1977
deployment made any usefulness from a similar deterrent deployment doubtful at
that point in the crisis. Also, he revealed that, with hindsight, and while he
personally felt he did not have enough justification to deploy a submarine on 5
March, he wished SSN deployment had occurred earlier than it actually did. iRef.
pp. 43, 87-8]
This was a missed opportunity. Author Gavshon and Desmond Rice in their
book, The Sinking of the Belgrano [Ref. 57], make this point explicitly. They
report that in 1977, then Foreign Minister, David Owen made arrangements for the
covert naval presence. However, James Callaghan, then Prime Minister, contends
that the Argentine Government had been informed. Press reports in 1982 indicate
that the United States informed the Argentines in 1977 on behalf of British. The
Franks Report found no evidence of Argentine knowledge of the 1977 deployment
[Ref. 56:p. 91]. Rice and Gavshon's point being that: "Whether or not the
Argentines had been warned in 1977, in 1982 Lord Carrington knew of no useful
precedent for using a naval presence for purposes of deterrence." [Ref. C7:pp. 9-
10]
If the Argentine knowledge of the 1977 deployment could have been verified,
based on the positive outcome of the December 1977 negotiations, the deterrent
value of the overt SSN deployment might have been utilized much earlier--
possibly deterring the 2 April Argentine invasion. Despite the initial covert
nature of the 1977 deployment, the failure to "signal" presence prevented earl;,
implementation of a plausible strategy in 1982. After the success of the 1977
negotiations an appropriate signal could have been sent by an SSN visit at Port
Stanley.
Another alternative was the early covert, non-provocative deployment of
the SSN to be utilized in an overt interpositioning strategy once positive
indication of the Argentine invasion was received, essentially a repeat of the 1977
strategy. This latter diplomatic strategy was attempted when Spartan was ordered
South on 29 March, but Lord Carrington's three week delay nullified these efforts.
Positive indication of Argentine invasion was received on 31 March. With
SSNs already ordered South, but not yet underway, a front page Times headline
story reported the nuclear-powered submarine, HMS Superb, as having been re-
routed South from exercises near Gibraltar "several days ago." The next day, 1
April, the Times, again on the front page, commented:
The report involving . . . [HMS Superb] is beginning to look more and more
like a controlled leak which need not even be true to have the desired effect.
The Royal Navy has refused to confirm that Superb was on its way to South
Georgia.
Conjecture in the press as to the whereabouts and purpose of Superb continued
throughout the first three weeks of April, until Superb was confirmed in its home
port of Faslane on 21 April [Ref. 58]. This could be viewed as an attempt at pre-
invasion deterrence and post invasion perception management on the part of the
British. Lord Carrington, however, took a negative view, and noted that the
Argentines might receive "the impression that the British were- seeking a naval
rather than diplomatic solution." [Ref. 5G:p. GG] Lord Carrington s concerns over
the press reports were probably genuine, however, the possibility that a
deliberate government attempt at disinformation may have been in\ oh ed in fact
cannot be ruled out. This is especially so in light of the coinciding intelligence
discovery of an early morning 2 April invasion time. On 9 April, The Nev, York
Times printed a press report that head-lined, "Four Nuclear Subs Will Spearhead
British Flotilla," and stated that the 8 April dateline had been "confirmed" by
"military sources." There were few reasons to doubt these reports in the British
press, considering the build-up of the naval Task Force following the invasion.
HMS Spartan achieved visual landfall on the Falklands on 12 April. This
coincided with the British declaration of the 200 nm. Maritime Exclusion Zone
(MEZ). Spartan had arrived in her patrol area the day before. The submarine
blockade of Argentine shipping around the Falklands was not perfect, as one
confirmed instance of seaborne replenishment occurred undetected and the
Argentine airborne supply effort to the islands continued. The dual
political/military nature of the submarine blockade was substantiated by the
Government's refusing permission to attack a minor Argentine combatant, as
described by Martin Middlebrook [Ref. 59]:
The Argentine naval-landing ship Cabo San Antoniovias spotted off Stanley
on four consecutive days, apparently laying mines, but Spartan was refused
permission to attack, partly to conceal the presence of the submarine for
attacks on larger targets but mainly to avoid opening the shooting war too
soon and compromising the diplomatic efforts still being pursued. [Ref. 59:pp.
97-8]
On 20 April the British, "warned that any approach by Argentine forces which
could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the
South Atlantic would be dealt with appropriately." (Ref. 60] On 30 April the
British established a 200 nm. Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) around the Falkland
islands [Ref. 61 J. 1
5
This timing roughly coincided with the arrival of the main
British Task Force. The Argentine Navy was at sea patrolling just outside the TEZ
in four task groupings. The Argentine aircraft carrier, Vienticinco De Mayo (25th
of May) led one group and the cruiser ARA General Belgrano led another. The two
15 According to CDR D. Peace [Ref. 61], there was effectively no difference
between the Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) and the Total Maritime Exclusion Zone
(TEZ) as stated and enforced by the British. Both the MEZ and the TEZ excluded
all Argentine shipping, as opposed to the U.S. Quarantine of Cuba which excluded
only specific cargoes and let non-offending cargoes pass. As the author
understood his explanation the term "exclusion" zone semantically equated to
"war" zone.
CDR Peace also explained to the author that it is not U.S. policy to use or
recognize "exclusion" zones, because of implications and precedents that might
impact on the longstanding U.S. position on freedom of navigation. The U.S.
position is to establish "warning" zones that communicate to all vessels a
potential risk and to specifically place at risk those vessels not observing
' warning" zone requirements, but this policy does not exclude any vessel.
other groups were comprised entirely of destroyers and frigates. (Ref. 62:pp.l7-
8] The positioning of Argentine forces resembled a classic pincher movement with
the Belgra.no group Southwest of the Falklands and the Argentine carrier
Northeast on each flank.
A political decision had been made in the British War Cabinet to take action
against the Argentine Navy in an effort to reduce the naval risk to the Task Force.
This was deemed especially necessary after an aborted attack by the Vienticinco
De Mayo in the early morning of 2 May. The Argentine carrier had penetrated the
TEZ and had been detected by a Harrier patrol just after midnight local time on a
course to attack the Task Force. It eventually closed the range to within 180 nm.
of the Task Force before light winds prevented the launch of the heavily loaded
Argentine attack aircraft. The Vienticinco De Mayo escaped undetected. The only
available target on the afternoon of 2 May was Genera] Belgrano, which was
outside the TEZ and was being shadowed by HMS Conqueror. The War Cabinet hud
been contacted about noon (London time) with a request for permission to attack
Belgrano. After a twenty minute discussion, permission was granted and messages
were passed to all submarines, "authorizing them to attack any Argentine
warships." [Ref. 59:pp. 145-7]
Conqueor's attack on Belgrano was the first time any SSN had fired a warshot
in anger. Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, Commanding Officer, described
his attack as, "tedious rather than operationally difficult." He has explained that
he chose to use the World War II-vintage Mark 8 torpedo instead of a modern
Tigerfish because of its heavier warhead. He has also revealed that his first
post-attack thoughts were of evasion, rather than remaining to attack the two
accompanying destroyers. [Ref. 59;pp. 148-91
On 7 May the British announced a warning that "any Argentine warship or
military aircraft over 12 miles from the Argentine coast would be treated as
hostile." [Ref. 60:p. 5] The Argentine Navy never again ventured beyond this line.
The following British assessment of the SSN contribution to the campaign is
provided in the Ministry of Defense report to Parliament, The Falklands Campaign:
The Lessons (Ref. 60]:
Our nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) played a crucial role. After the
sinking of the General Belgrano the Argentine surface fleet effectively took
no further part in the Campaign. The SSNs were flexible and powerful
instruments throughout the crisis, posing a ubiquitous threat which the
Argentines could neither measure nor oppose. Their speed and independence
of support meant that they were the first assets to arrive in the South
Atlantic, enabling us to declare the maritime exclusion zone early. They also
provided valuable intelligence to our forces in the total exclusion zone.
[Ref. 60:p. 17]
Five SSNs and one conventionally-powered British submarine operated in the
South Atlantic during the Falkland crisis. The Argentine Navy operated two
submarines during the campaign and, as in the British case, the world press
assisted in advertising their threat. The first was Santa Fe, which inserted troops
during the 2 April invasion. However, it was caught on the surface during
reinforcement operations at South Georgia, and damaged by British helicopters
using anti-ship missiles and depth-bombs. The Santa Fe, an ex-U.S. Guppy class
submarine, sank after being abandoned at the pier in Grytviken, South Georgia.
The San Luis, a German built type-209 submarine, operated against the British
Task Force for several days with disappointing results due to "material problems"
with both primary and backup fire control systems [Ref. 62:p. 63]. Unknown to the
British, two other Argentine submarines, another type-209 and another Guppy
class, were not operational during the conflict. These unaccounted for submarines
kept the ASW picture of the British Task Force ver j uncertain. British ASw" efforts
expended large amounts of ordinance at higher rates than expected against a
single submarine operating against the British Task Force without results (Ref.
62:p. 34-6]. The Argentine submarines were an announced threat to the British
Task Force; however, their inability to produce measurable results negated their
coercive value. The torpedoing of one of the British ASW carriers or a troop
transport during the San Carlos landings might have changed the political climate
in Britain radically, perhaps as much as the sinking of the Belgra.no had changed
the political climate in Buenos Aires, once the truth became known to the
Argentine public.
The U.S. Navy version of the Falklands war "lessons" [Ref. 62] looked at the
involvement of submarines by both sides and provides some similar findings.
Submarines played a significant role in the Falklands conflict by their
actual operations and by the threat of their actions. The loss of a British
aircraft carrier or troop transport to submarine attack might have curtailed
the entire British operation.
Similarly, the British SSNs appear to have served as a deterrent to
Argentine surface naval operations, especially after the sinking of the
General Belgrano. British submarines also served in the reconnaissance and
intelligence collection roles. [Ref. 62:p. 63]
The Department of tht Navy report, Lessons of the Falklands, goes on to suggest
how th ' S. ,J.; applj these lessons in the future:
In a similar crisis or conflict the U.S. Navy could employ its attack
submarine force in the same manner. Additionally, U.S. SSNs could provide
direct support to carrier battle groups, increasing their ASW effectiveness,
while the submarine-launched Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles provide
enhanced anti-ship and strike capabilities to SSNs. The operating
characteristics of SSNs also permit their early, clandestine deployment in
time of crisis, giving increased flexibility to national leaders. [Ref. 62:p. 63]
In summary, submarines were originally utilized as a quick reaction platform
to provide naval presence in a distant ocean area, until a robust surface task
is to be a covert action to be disclosed at a latter time
for diplomatic leverage; however, the Argentine invasion of 2 April circumvented
the original deterrent purpose of the submarine deployment.
The presence of the British submarine was conveyed originally through an
apparently false leak to the press. It is nearly impossible to determine if this leak
was intentional on the part of the Government, but subsequent leaks on the
movement of SSNs began to gain the appearance of press releases. With the early
8 April announcement and 12 April enforcement of the MEZ, prior to any visible
surface forces being present the Argentines must have assumed that it was being
enforced by submarines. If submarines were not physically present, the press
releases and/or leaks provided a credibility that made the MEZ more than a paper
blockade. Although there were Argentine violations of the MEZ, the volume of
maritime reinforcement of the occupied Falkland Islands was reduced to below
detectable levels, suggesting that a submarine -enforced MEZ produced the desired
effect.
The submarine presence was a coercive force that allowed enforcement of the
MEZ from 12 April until 30 April. The Argentine Navy came out to meet the Royal
Navy that announced its presence with the establishment of the TEZ and the
initiation of strike operations against the Port Stanley airfield and surrounding
areas. On 2 Ma> , the Argentine Navy demonstrated that it presented an
unacceptable risk to the British Task Force. The SSN, the political weapon of
choice, provided a violent deterrent demonstration. If Conqueror's attack had
been carried out by Royal Navy Harriers or Exocet missiles, it would not have had
the same deterrent effect. As it was, the Argentine Navy was coerced into
believing it lacked the equipment, confidence, and perhaps the competence to meet
the SSN threat. As a result the 7 May British warning to the Argentines not to
exceed the 12-mile limit went unchallenged by the Argentine Navy.
Unquestionably, the sinking of the Belgra.no created political and moral
repercussions for the British. The force of world public opinion that had recently
aligned behind Britain was suddenly weakened. This loss was regained two days
later, after the successful Argentine attack on the HMS Sheffield with an Exocet
missile. These repercussions might have been mitigated, if the subtle and abrupt
changes to the rules of engagement had been stated more clearly. The 23 April
subtle warning statement was evidently not widely known to both the Argentines
and the public. If it was known, it was not clear how it would be interpreted. The
2 May abrupi change to the rules of engagement were justified post facto and while
being accepted on their own account, were publicly judged not to be congruent with
the 23 April warning. Granted, this was the first instance a submarine had been
used in this manner, and it is not the type of activity to be submitted to
experimentation; but, perception management in international affairs is not a new
science. Perception management of submarines in the Third World coercive
diplomacy role is a new area of that science that requires greater study and
prudence in practice.
There has been some speculation that one of the four British nuclear ballistic
missile submarines (SSBXs), deployed to the South Atlantic during the Falklands
crisis [Ref. 63). This is unlikely, for several reasons.
First, the force level of four SSBNs is based on keeping one at sea on
deterrent patrol at all times as a minimum deterrent. Since the deterrent target
package of the Soviet Union could not be covered in the South Atlantic, a second
SSBN would have been required to deploy South. This would have strained tht
patrol rotation to the breaking point, because the length of the conflict could not
be forecast and a third SSBN is usually unavailable in extended overhaul. The
fourth SSBN, recently rotated off patrol, would need to limit the scope of its
scheduled upkeep period to maintain seaworthiness, hedging against the
possibility that the on-station SSBN could not continue patrol and required relief.
Second, although Argentina is a non-signatory to the Nuclear Proliferation
Treaty and is thought to be a threshold nation, or proliferant, there was little to
suggest that Argentina was in possession of nuclear weapons, nor did she have the
capability to deliver one against Britain [Ref. 64]. 16 And, since Argentina was
desperately seeking the approval of world public opinion, it was unlikely she
would use a nuclear weapon against the British Task Force. Third, Britain, as a
"possessing nation" signatory the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, was pledged to
protect nations not in possession of nuclear weapons from nuclear aggression. The
burden of proof would have rested with Britain to prove Argentine possession of
nuclear weapons and the intent to use them.
Finally, the limited war strategy of the British campaign deliberately limited
military action against the Argentine mainland. Some small contingents might
have been inserted for tactical intelligence-gathering, but, by and large, the
mainland was intentionally left unscathed. For the British, the Falkland islands
were the only point of contention, and it would have been counter productive to
assault mainland targets for reasons of public opinion and limited conflict
strategy. Thus, the deployment of an SSBN would have been entirely contrary to
16 See Eric H. Amett [Ref. 64]. He discusses the conventional submarine-
nuclear tipped torpedo combination as a possible nuclear weapon delivery means
for emerging nuclear powers. He also notes*, while Argentina has the submarines
and heavy torpedo technology, it supposedly lacks the miniaturization technologj
necessary for a nuclear torpedo warhead.
the political context of the struggle and the limited war strategy actually
followed. Even as a hedge against the unlikely Argentine use of nuclear weapons,
the repercussion of an inadvertent press leak of a South Atlantic SSBN deployment
would not have been worth potential gains.
This chapter has focused mainly on the use of conventionally armed
submarines for diplomatic purposes. The above discussion suggest several reasons
why nuclear armed submarines were not appropriate in this particular instance.
That is not to say that nuclear weapons on submarines cannot be used for specific
coercive diplomatic measures within the context of general nuclear deterrence.
Chapter Six reviews events where SSBNs were used for strategic coercive
signalling with respect to specific instances of raised diplomatic tensions.
VI. SUBMARINE "NUCLEAR" DIPLOMACY
A. STRATEGIC DETERRENCE WITH SUBMARINES
It is a common myth that the United States was the first nation to send
ballistic missile submarines to sea. In truth, the Soviet Union edged out the
United States by three years. The Zulu-V class submarine's ballistic missile
capability was formally confirmed at-seain May 1959, but reports of its existence
had arrived in the West as early as 1956 [Ref. 65], The USS George Washington was
not commissioned until late December 1959. While the U.S. nuclear powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) were conceived and built as a complement to
the existing nuclear deterrent of land based bombers and missiles, there is some
question over the intended mission of early Soviet ballistic missile submarine
designs.
One view holds that the diesel-powered Zulu-X and Golf-class SSBs, and the
Hotel-class SSBNs were designed mainly to attack naval targets on the U.S.
seaboards such as aircraft carriers in port, naval communications, port facilities,
etc., and especially for the mid-ocean anti-carrier warfare role during a NATO-
Warsaw Pact conflict [Ref. 66]. This is entirely different from the "conventional"
concept of SSBNs as a strategic, "city-busting," deep strike deterrent. It was not
until after the emergence of the Yankee- class SSBN in 1967, with a corresponding
change in Soviet doctrine, that most Western analysts concluded that Soviet SSBN
roles and missions were comparable with those of their U.S. counterparts
[Ref. 67j. 17
If the Soviet and U.S. SSBN tasks and capabilities are roughly comparable,
hardly the same can be said for their respective operating "styles." 18 The U.S.
SSBN fleet uses a two-crew manning system. This system permits approximately
one-half of the SSBN force to be on patrol at any given time. By contrast the
Soviets maintain only a small fraction, about 15 percent, of their SSBNs at sea
[Ref. 68). This allows a majority of the fleet to be maintained at high in-port
readiness levels while minimizing operational wear-and-tear. and, as a
consequence, maintenance costs and requirements. 19 One drawback of this
practice is that crews and equipments receive only a minimum of at-sea
experience. From a "diplomatic" point of view, however, there may be certain
17 Moore, Flanigan, and Heisel [Ref. 66:pp. 170-3] take the view that the
Yankee class was conceived and built for the mid-ocean anti-carrier role,
however, development problems with the SS-NX-1 3 anti-ship ballistic missile
suggest a possibility that the long range "SS-N-6waiS intended as an interim fix
. . . [that] seemed better suited for continental targets than for mobile naval
targets." Since the SS-NX-13, apparently has never been deployed, their
argument is that the Yankee backed into the "conventional" SSBN role.
1 8 The author is very much aware of different debates concerning whether the
Soviet SSBNs are to be used as part of a first strike or as the core of a withholding
strategy. Similarly, for both nations it is uncertain whether SLBMs (submarine
launched ballistic missiles) are to be used in a counter-force or a counter -value
targeting strategy. With the advent of the D-5 Trident II missile, even a first-
strike hard-target kill role is conceivable for the applicable portion of U.S. SSBNs.
The focus is not on how the SLBMs will be used, but how the SSBNs are deployed,
or could be deployed for diplomatic, coercive or otherwise, purposes short of
nuclear or conventional war.
1 9 It has also been suggested that this maintains the bulk of the SSBN force "at
a short tether." The generals of the Strategic Rocket Forces exert operational
control over the SSBNs, supposedly a measure of the Army's historic mistrust of the
Navy. Ranft and Till [Ref. 68] suggesi two other possible reasons foi the low
deployment rate: first, the maintenance of a surge deployment capacity, and
second, a combination of environmental, geographic, and manpower problems with
SSBN refits and nuclear power plant operations.
benefits. For one, the Soviets could claim the "high moral ground," with the
argument that a low patrol tempo is another Soviet contribution to minimizing
tensions at-sea. Such a claim glosses over the fact that the majority of Soviet
SSBN fleet can now hit the majority of its strategic targets while still tied to the
pier, but a "moral" argument rarely derives its persuasiveness from "facts" alone.
"Strategic" signalling may be easier with an SSBN fleet, at least 80 percent
of which is normally withheld in port or in costal waters. Clearly, were the Soviet
out-of-area SSBN fleet to suddenly swell to, say, 70 percent instead of the routine
15 percent, this would send a very strong coercive signal to Washington (provided
anybody was still in town to receive it). A similar U.S. effort at strategic
signalling would result in a theoretical increase from about 50% to about 70% over
a period of several days. 20 The longer generation time is required in order to
release SSBNs normally under upkeep. Of course, such 'signalling" would not be
viewed in isolation; both U.S. and Soviet SSBN augmentations would be part of a
larger pattern of strategic crisis preparations and "bargaining."
Nu doubt, an increase in Soviet SSBN deployments from 15 to 70 percent in
just a few days would be highly dramatic and, arguably, a "de-stabilizing" event,
so much so, that one might bo tempted to conclude that diplomacy has already
failed, and war become inevitable. This view forgets that the definition of
diplomacy also includes the use of force, coercive or violent, to obtain goals
outside a nation's jurisdiction (see page 4). Diplomacy would still be possible,
albeit under considerably more pressure, which, of course, ma> be the desired
20 kanft and Till [Ref.68] cite the Department of Defense Posture Statement for
FY 1979, p. 28, as stating that the previous years Poseidon deployment rate had
i ~l { ere enl . This figure is impressive and full} support] /e of the current
U.S. deterrent policy , hovi e\ ei , maintaining such a high deploy rnenl rale ma} make
an> attempl at strategic signalling with U.S. SSBNs less noticeable.
effect. Should this change in Soviet SSBN deployment scheme occur over a
prolonged period, say a month, the diplomatic pressures would increase more
slowly. If the change occurred over six months or a year, obviously the result of
a sustained effort, it may only suggest a change in deployment strategy; thus, the
diplomatic signalling aspect is subdued, while the nature of the threat change
remains the same.
The remainder of this chapter is a review of instances where ballistic missile
submarines have been used for political signalling. Again, for security reasons
the details are sketchy, but enough is known of these events from open sources to
suggest that SSBNs have periodically been deployed (or re-deployed ) for political
rather than purely operational reasons.
B. GENERAL STRATEGIC SIGNALLING
Blechman and Kaplan have delineated only four incidents where, "An overt
and explicit threai was directed at the USSR through global actions of U.S.
strategic forces. ..." (Kef. l:p. 47] These events were: the 1956 Suez crisis, the
Lebanon intervention of 1958, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and the October
1973 Arab-Israeli War. Only the latter two cases could possibly involve U.S.
SSBNs as part of signalling this nuclear threat."
The U.S. Navy's SSBN force was only nine ships strong when the Cuban missile
crisis occurred. Six SSBNs were on patrol prior to October 22, when President
Kennedy made his Quarantine announcement. When Soviet missiles were found in
Cuba, the USS Abraham Lincoln was alongside her tender in Holy Loch, Scotland in
the middle of a maintenance upkeep period. The new USS Thomas A. Edison and USS
John Marshall had been commissioned but had yet to make their first deterrent
patrols. The Abraham Lincoln departed for her patrol station within 15 hours
after notification on 21 October. The Thomas A. Edison completed her
preparations and departed on 7 November. [Ref. 47:pp. 142-3]
Granted, these events were only a small portion of U.S. strategic preparations
for the Cuban missile crisis, but the alteration of the Abraham Lincoln's upkeep
period was possibly the most visible signal available to the Soviets at the time.
It is also possible that this was intended for military expediency rather than
signalling, but nevertheless, it was a strategic signal.
It must be presumed that similar circumstances occurred during the October
1973 Arab-Israeli War. On 25 October, in an apparent attempt to deter Soviet
intervention on behalf of Syria, the U.S. placed its military forces in defense
readiness condition three (DEFCON 3). This included some strategic forces and it
is a fair assumption that SSBNs in upkeep had their routine schedules visibly
altered. Considering Soviet advancements in intelligence-gathering and direct
Washington-Moscow communications over the "hot-line," the Soviets were not as
reliant on U.S. SSBN deployment routines as a conspicuous source of strategic
"signalling." In this instance the alteration of SSBN upkeep schedules would have
served as operational confirmation of the announced DEFCON 3 "signal." In this
second case, U.S. SSBNs were clearly involved in coercive diplomacy.
C. 1963 U.S. SSBN VISIT TO TURKEY
After the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the United States removed its Jupiter
intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) based in Turkey. To have simply
removed the Jupiters without substitute, might readily have been interpreted by
the Turks as further evidence that the American strategic guarantee had become
less certain. The USS Sam Houston (SSBN-609) visited Izmir, Turkey in April 1 963.
Thus, the United States Navy demonstrated, through a SSBN foreign port visit,
that the U.S. strategic deterrent remained committed to the defense of Turkey and
NATO's southern flank. [Ref. 47:p. 219, and Ref. l:p. 48]
One author has questioned the wisdom of this strategic substitution:
Regrettably, the Foiaris-SSBN weapons system became a "substitute"
deterrent for Jupiter IRBMs rather than an "additive" deterrent.
Additionally, placing the SSBNs in the enclosed environs of the
Mediterranean added to their vulnerability to Soviet detection, localization,
and attack as compared to their near invulnerability in the open ocean
environment for which they had been designed. (Ref. 47]
His argument is not without merit, but ignores some strategic realities. The
Jupiters were liquid fueled and extremely vulnerable "soft" targets. These IRBMs
were within easy range of a Soviet preemptive attack and possibly contributed
more to "instability" than deterrent stability. Advancing missile technology had
already made the Jupiter IRBMs obsolete, and they were difficult and no longer
cost-effective to maintain. The removal of the JupiterlRBUs was foreseen in 1962
and, due to the advent of land based ICBMs and submarine launched SLBMs, it was
doubtfuJ that they would be replaced by missiles based in Turkey. There were
many good reasons to remove the Jupiter IRBMs from Turkey, especially if they
could be traded for the Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 IRBMs in Cuba, with U.S. strategic
commitments maintained by SLBMs.
Because the Jupiters were land based they had an intrinsic political value
to the Turks. Removing the Jupiters stripped the Turks of a visible countervailing
deterrent against Soviet IRBMs. When the Jupiters were removed, the Soviet IRBM
threat remained, and the SSBN visit to Izmir signified a continued U.S. political
and strategic commitment to Turkey. The rhetoric of extended deterrence would
have been meaningless to the Turks without a credible, "visible" strategic
commitment that the Sam Houston visit provided.
Basing the U.S. nuclear deterrent on foreign territory creates strong political
and military commitments that are not easily replicated by naval or other
strategic forces. For this reason Sea launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) offered by
the United States were deemed inappropriate by NATO as a deterrent response to
Soviet SS-20s, when land based Pershing //and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles
(GLCMs) were available as an Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) deterrent
option. It should be noted that this NATO dismissal of the SLCM option was
specific to this situation and not a rejection of the principle of SLCM extended
deterrence. While the specific threat of Soviet SS-20s has been removed, other
threats may appear in Europe that may require an INF-like substitute. If this
should occur, with the land base option precluded, as it was for the Turks, nuclear
SLCMs provide an--again viable—substitute.
Commenting on Sam Houston 's Izmir visit, Blechman and Kaplan repor t: "That
port v isil ., the only such visit to a foreign port by a U.S. strategic submarine that
weknowof "Z1 [Ref. l:p. 49] Their work was published in 1978. It so happens
that, b} the late 1970s the U.S. Navy had established a program of SSBN foreign
port visits that continues to this day. Officially, all U.S. SSBN port calls are
"operational visits" based on requirements of logistics, or crew rest and
recreation, with very few having any specific diplomatic purposes involved
2
• Blechman and Kaplan's comment is based on the earlier work of Blechman and
Levinson, which includes the comment. "And the writers are aware of onlj one visit
bj a U.S. strategic submarine to a foreign state—aside from the usual Polaris
visits to established operational bases at Holy Loch (Scotland), Rota (Spain), and
Guam,' [Ref. 70:p. 4021
[Ref. 69]. A list of all known U.S. SSBN foreign port visits during the six year
period, mid- 1983 through mid- 1989, is provided in the Appendix.
The data in the Appendix contest the casual inference of Blechman and
Kaplan that every U.S. SSBN port visit should be viewed as signalling a special
diplomatic event. The scope of these visits suggest, that through SSBN port visits,
the U.S. desires to convey strategic support and "presence" in the same manner
that a declared and demonstrated 50% deterrent patrol cycle supports strategic
deterrence, as opposed to using SSBN port visits only to bolster specific
weaknesses in the U.S. -allied strategic deterrent framework.
One special diplomatic case is included in the Appendix data. At the request
of the Venezuelan Government, the USS Simon Boli var (SSBN -641) visited Port
Cabello in July 1989, during a Venezuelan national holiday (Ref. 69]. This visit
(and others) further refutes Blechman and Kaplan's casual inference, since it is
doubtful that the Venezuelan Government was in need of strategic support.
Undoubtedly, some SSBN port visits are intended to show strategic support
for the host countries, Turkey being one example. While the data of the Appendix
shows a larger design, specific port visits by SSBNs and SSNs can continue to be
used to convey strategic support. After the submarine departs, an invisible
"presence" remains [Ref. 8:p. 2nJ.
D. SOVIET SUBMARINE VISITS TO CUBA 1969-1974
Between July 1969 and May 1974, Soviet submarines called on Cuban ports
in a pattern that became progressively more "visible." Gradually, the types of
submarines involved escalated from Foxtrot diesel-powered attack submarines to
a highlj publicized visit by a Golf-ll diesel-powered ballistic missile submarine.
No visits by more advanced boats, e.g. Hotel or Yankee, have been reported,
however, Cuban-based Soviet salvage efforts on behalf of a Yankee-class SSBN
in 1986 suggest Soviet access to Cuban port facilities has assumed a "strategic"
importance. By itself, each successive step was an inconsequential escalation
over the previous visit: the first visit consisted of two Foxtrots that entered port
with a tender, while an accompanying nuclear-powered cruise missile equipped
Echo-U remained at sea; on the second visit a Echo-ll accompanied the two
Foxtrots and a tender into port. [Ref. 70]
Also in 1970, the U.S. detected what appeared to be the beginnings of a
Soviet forward submarine base at Cienfuegos. This resulted in a "mini-crisis" that
was resolved with a 1 970 "understanding" of the 1962 "understanding" concerning
U.S. -USSR-Cuban relations. [Ref. 71]
However, the submarine visits themselves continued, each slightly more
provocative than the previous, seemingly "probing the margins" of the
understandings to test "the strength and endurance of U.S. will and commitments."
[Ref. 70:p. 407] Various explanations have been offered for this Soviet behavior,
military advantage, signalling as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) negotiations, Soviet Nav^ bureaucratic politics, Soviet-Cuban relations,
and testing of U.S. strategic leniency [Ref. 70:pp. 432-7].
Only two Golf-U SSBs visited Cuba. The first one, when departing on 6 May
1972, was harassed, being forced to surface several times [Ref. 72]. It has been
speculated that this was a A/'arv decision, since both President Nixon and Henry
Kissinger attended the Moscow Summit at the time, and were reportedly unaware
of this incident until much later [Ref. 71 :p. 60]. It is also worth noting that the
incidenl occurred a: the sarm time that final negotiations were in progress
between the U.S. and Soviet navies on the "Prevention of Incidents On and Over
the High Seas" (INSEA) agreement and U.S. Navy operational commanders had been
"specifically warned to avoid any incidents with Soviet naval ships which might
jeopardize the negotiations." [Ref. 21:p. 60)
The Soviet submarine visits to Cuba are an example of the entire spectrum
of submarine types being utilized for diplomatic purposes. It also provides an
"almost textbook case of Soviet political-military tactics." [Ref. 70:p. 426]
Eventually, in 1978 the Cubans received two Fox trot- class submarines for their
own navy, perhaps the Soviet effort was intended to pre-condition the United
States for this eventual transfer. Whatever its ultimate purpose, the program of
Soviet submarine visits used ballistic missile submarines to influence the
thoughts and actions of foreign decision makers.
E. SOVIET ANALOGOUS RESPONSE PATROLS
In 1984, the Soviets deployed Delta-class SSBNs in an uncharacteristic
fashion to the Atlantic and Pacific offshore patrol areas. These deployments
augmented the normal patrols of older }'a/]Aree-class SSBNs. The military impact
of the change was minimal and considered more of a political statement targeted
at public opinion after a "Soviet pledge to shift additional nuclear missiles closer
to the U.S. in retaliation for the American deployment of medium-range nuclear
missiles in Western Europe." [Ref. 18] This effort could be considered successful
case of "signalling, " in that Soviet political objection to the NATO INF deployments
was conveyed in an "expressive" use of limited naval force. The "Euro-missiles"
were removed from Europe by the INF treaty and the Delta SSBNs ceased the
mid-ocean patrols without fanfare; however, it is ludicrous to suggest that the
"analogous response" patrols coerced the U.S. into accepting an INF agreement.
This is a primary example of how an relatively insignificant change in
military capability or routine can be used for political effect. The change in SSBN
deployment pattern, accompanied by public statement, sent a clear diplomatic and
political message, even if it did not appreciably sway the military balance or, for
that matter, the NATO decision to go ahead and deploy the "Euro-missiles."
The basic argumentof this chapter has been that ballistic missile submarines
also have political utility. The logical extension of that argument is that nuclear
weapons have political utility. James Tritten [Ref. 78] argues this at length,
specific to this event he comments.
The Soviets are not adverse in using nuclear weapons for > acetime
coercion .... This deployment served no significant military purpose and was
clearly a case of using nuclear weapons to coerce the West. Having the
existing forces in their navy allowed the USSR to make a political statement
that was otherwise virtually impossible to do. [Ref. 7o:p. 21 6)
This case has been presented in the context of Cable's argument that SSBNs
cannot conduct "gunboat diplomacy." This author would agree if the 'terms' of
gunboat diplomacy had not changed since the phrase was first coined. It is true
enough that SSbN "presence" will have little relevance for the U.S. (or Soviet.)
ability to influence a "conventional" crisis in Asia oi Africa. But the modern-
day context for military "signalling" is much broader than events in the Third
World. For more than 40 years, the two superpowers have sought to influence the
others behavior through the implied, i.e. political threat of nuclear force. Whether
or not they have been successful is besides the point. Nuclear threats are
believed to have political meaning. By the same token nuclear "signalling" at sea
is believed to have political content.
While, the superpowers have been content to "signal" back and forth at the
strategic level, the future possibility exists that nuclear weapons proliferation
may produce a "nuclear pariah state." It is an open question for "responsible"
nuclear powers as how best to deter (or coerce) the "irresponsible" nuclear power.
The SSBN and nuclear SLCM provide low exposure options that can reinforce
political rhetoric at great distances in ways few other nuclear platforms can
match. If a "nuclear pariah state" comes into being, perhaps the SSBN (and for
that matter, nuclear weapons) will not just be for superpower signalling, anymore.
The majority of this thesis addresses the political utility of submarine force
without nuclear weapons and has approached ballistic missile submarines similarly
without focusing on nuclear weapons. However, it is obvious that nuclear weapons
and submarines are a synergistic combination--strategically, tactically, and
politically . Since, naval diplomacy has direct parallels with nuclear deterrence,
perhaps the submarine, the best naval platform for nuclear deterrence, has
something to contribute to general naval diplomacy.
VII. THE FUTURE OF SUBMARINES IN NAVAL DIPLOMACY
A. A REVIEW
The first chapter of this thesis sought to develope a working definition of
"naval diplomacy." Attention was paid to the differences between "latent" and
"active," and between "coercive" and "cooperative" forms of "naval force without
war." Also considered were the different concepts of the conduct of naval
diplomacy that have been offered by different analysts. The central concept of ail
these theoretical discussions was the threat of force. Theoretically, any armed
platform able to operate in the maritime environment is capable of coercive naval
diplomacy. It follows from this that the submarine must be viewed as a platform
that is at least capable of coercive naval diplomacy. However, the practice of
naval diplomacy requires the communication of a threat.
The second chapter addressed the different viewpoints of "experts" on
submarines as a useful platforms for naval diplomacy. This showed that the
acceptability uf the submarine as a naval diplomatic tool turns on the
communication issue--most analysts, including some submarine operators
themselves, believe that the submarine is intrinsically incapable (or unwilling!)
of "credible signalling." Dominating the broad rejection of the submarine's
"gunboat diplomatic" value is a, sometimes unstated, paradigm of how naval
diplomacy ought to be conducted. If readers could examine each paradigm, they
will find different assumptions about available force mix, geography, logistics,
domestic and international political climate, and threat perception. Most
"experts arc e\ identic skeptical about including submarines in their paradigm of
naval diplomacy; yet their war-fighting paradigm would not be without
submarines. Some analysts concede a limited applicability for submarines in
coercive naval diplomacy, i.e. at the "highest" levels of diplomatic contest:
between the superpowers or when a high price in political repercussions is
willingly paid for the potential gains of using the submarine violently. This view
suggests the following metaphor: the submarine is the "meat clever" of naval
diplomacy, while the destroyer, battleship, and aircraft carrier are the "filet
knives!" This view does not deny, but it does limit, the submarine's diplomatic-
usefulness.
Again, it is necessary to return to the idea of communicating a threat. The
destroyer, battleship, and aircraft carrier must protect themselves from
nonproportional force in violent, "meat clever," fashion. In other words, the
credibility of these platforms in delicate, proportional, nonviolent, coercive naval
diplomacy in a filet knife manner, ultimately depends on the credibility and
capability to dispense meat clever force. Once a naval platform is required to act
or react violently, "adequate force" must be used. "Adequate force," not to be
confused with the militarily imprudent concept of "minimum force,"- 1 is rarely
considered proportional about the aim point. Thus, if required to use its weapons,
every naval platform will dispense adequate force. With the proliferation of Third
World submarines and anti-ship missiles, adequate force, will require, with
increasing frequency, nonproportional force. It should be apparent at this point
22 Valerie Adams [Ref. 58:pp. 91-21 explains the difference: "This [minimum
force] is a widely quoted phrase, but one which has no categorical legal--or
military- -definition. It means the least amount of force necessary to secure a
particuitti ubjecti . c, but to be sure of securing trie objective, the military must use
adt-quHic force: thai is, enough to be reasonably sure of putting an enemy out of
action." (emphasis in original)
that the submarine is awaiting a skilled practitioner of naval diplomacy--a lucid
communicator of threats--to pick up the meat clever and deftly, coercively, and
proportionally wield it across the entire spectrum of naval diplomacy, as though
it were a filet knife.
The third and fourth chapters dealt with arguments that the potential
submarine diplomat must be aware of and conversant with. The fifth and sixth
chapters considered salient cases of submarines being used for diplomatic
purposes. This concluding chapter examines the prospects for the submarine in
naval diplomacy.
B. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR SUBMARINES AS NAVAL DIPLOMATIC TOOLS
1. Impact of Technological Change
Technology can be expected to affect the future role of submarines in
naval diplomacy in many different ways. One--negative--possibility is the
long-rumored "breakthrough" in anti-submarine warfare that will, somehow, make
the oceans "transparent." Although this possibility cannot be ruled out in the
long run, all indications are that, foreseeable changes range from extremely slim
to nil [Ref. 25:p. 13].2a Anothej possibility would be (equally unlikely)
improvements in "traditional" naval diplomacy platforms, e.g. the creation of a
nearly impervious surface ship ASM defense or a doubling of the endurance of
carrier-based aircraft. Perhaps the most important technological area from the
standpoint of the submarine diplomatist is communications. In any case, the basic
23 Even if the oceans were to become "transparent," the submarine would be no
worse off than surface ships, and arguably better, since the submarine would still
be abl< to operate in two instead of one dimension. Alsu, if the "visibility'
argument still held relevance aganibi submarine diplomatic involvement, this
"breakthrough would nullif; thai line of reasoning.
military principles of flexibility and concentration of force can be met only with
difficulty as long as communication constraints limit the submarine to shallow
depths and low speeds. Research efforts to improve the submarine's
communication envelope for war-fighting purposes will have direct application to
the submarine naval diplomatic roles.
2. The Proportional Weapons Debate
The technology to produce a "proportional" submarine weapon exists
already today. However for a number of reasons it has yet to be exploited. Those
reasons are: first, with the submarine largely being viewed as "unsuitable" for
naval diplomacy, the expense has appeared unjustified; second, even if cost were
not a restriction, limited magazine space has dictated that valuable warshots take
first priority over proportional weapons that may never be used; third, by their
very nature, weapons of proportionality do not possess the devastating lethality
that is demanded to ensure submarine survivability in the modern high-threat
ASW environment. Yet, if submarines are to have a larger role in naval diplomacy,
what, if anything, can be done
.
There are two basic possibilities. On the one hand, it may be argued
that the threat of "disproportionate" force will be a greater deterrent than a
proportionate weapon. On the other, the advertisement ana employment of a
proportionate weapon might improve the credibility of submarine diplomacy. 24
Each position could be true, dependent on the capabilities and perceptions of the
24 This issue, i.e. the relative effectiveness of the threat of "disproportionate"
force vs. the threat of punishment-that-fits-the-crime, is central, of course, to
the entire concept of deterrence and includes two opposing "schools of thought:"
the "finality of deterrence' 1 approach and the "credibility of dett i rence" approach.
See, Y. Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace, pp. 30- i, Israel Program for
Scientific Translations. Jerusalem, 1966.
opposition, but the SSN commanding officer will remain reluctant to displace lethal
weapons with proportional ones when deploying to an area of potential conflict.
A proportionate weapons load-out may be acceptable if it is kept quite
limited. What is required first of all, however, is an admission that circumstances
will indeed arise in which the balance of political considerations and military
efficiency will dictate the disablement rather than the sinking of a ship. The
sinking of the General Belgra.no with significant loss of life in a limited naval war
"has highlighted at least the political need in special circumstances of a way to
disable a ship." (emphasis added) [Ref. 74] Still other conditions may dictate the
use of damage-inflicting rather than "absolute" weapons. One such condition has
been cited by D. A. Paolucci:
The possible environmental damage to friendly shores and fisheries (e.g.,
in the Mediterranean or Persian Gulf) caused by the sinking of supertankers
might, far outweigh the possible military value of such sinkings.
Furthermore, the option to disable does not close the option to sink. [Ref. 74]
A proportionate force capability will create new options above and beyond the all-
or-nothing choice of today. As such, the national leadership will be able to wield
the submarine tool with greater confidence, and deterrence will be strengthened.
One potential drawback is that the intended target of a proportional
attack may be too large to be caused appreciable damage (yet the point may be
made anyway). Conversely, it may be too small, too old, or too poorly manned to
survive, a proportionate attack. Nevertheless, a "disabling weapon" provides a
means to lower the threshold of "adequate force" available to the submarine. This
is not to say that the threshold of "adequate force" can or should be lowered for
every conceivable target; for a frigate-size and larger warship target, a single
warshot torpedo will remain the threshold of adequate force. The margin of
difference would apply to a target where the old threshold of a single warshot
torpedo would be considered an "adequate" overkill.
Opposition knowledge of the limited availability of such weapons on
each submarine might provide deterrent incentive. Since firing a "disabling
weapon," has proven that submarines are present and that their use is credible,
the opposition knows that the next step up the violence ladder will be warshots.
Thus, presented with a threat that he cannot defend himself from, combat
effectively, or avert, he will be deterred from his intended action.
3. Integrating Submarine Politics and Tactics
A key problem will be how to accommodate the unique requirements of
submarine diplomacy within the preferred operational employment scheme for U.S.
submarines. In actuality, the opportunities and constraints for proportionate
weapons use are much like those experienced in limited (submarine) war
situations. First, by alerting the opposition to the use of submarines, whether by
SPIN or a disabling weapon, the opponent is given the opportunity to prepare,
since the nature of the threat is now less uncertain; the opposition's training,
material condition, logistics, and strategy can be optimized for ASW. Also, an
alerted enemy will be more difficult to manage. The ocean is the submarine's
armor, the strength of which is maintained through stealth and by maintaining a
tactical advantage. The use of a "disabling weapon" or a SPIN would advertise the
submarine's presence and could conceivably seriously degrade the imperviousness
of that armor, the submarine may be placed at risk from a "damaged," but militarily
still functional target. Alternatively, the submarine may be required to remain
in the vicinity of a "disabled" high-political-value target, knowing that enemy
ASW force may shortly converge on the "flaming datum."
The preferred tactic from the submariner's view wouid be for the NCA to
make an open political statement defining the threshold of "unacceptable"
behavior that will trigger a violent counter, yet would not specify the particular
intended method of enforcement. This way the opponents operational uncertainty
will be ensured and the chance to optimize his military preparations minimized.
When the use of force is called for, the submarine will act or react with adequate
force. This will maintain the tactical advantage, minimize risk to the submarine,
and also maximize the deterrent effect. Preferably, the submarine can act without
being detected, so that the method of enforcement cannot be determined, and the
opponent's uncertainty remains. 25 This appears to be a solid, basic naval
diplomatic strategy that can accommodate any naval platform. [Ref. 75]
4. The Soviet Union
Arguably, the Soviet Union appreciates, more than any other nation, the
political coercive--as opposed to war-fighting--potential of the submarine.
Recent technological advances, notably in quieting, have made the Soviet Union's
latest generation of submarines more formidable opponents at any level of
conflict; one must presume that as Soviet submarine capability improves, so will
opportunities to exploit the submarine for diplomatic purposes.
25 The preceding two paragraphs are the author's convergence of the ideas of
CDR Steve Johnson |Ref. 75] and LCDR Paul Russo (Ref . 69]. CDR Johnson's thoughts
are that the submarine's armor is the ocean which it maintains by stealth. Any
specific datum (i.e. disabled ships, surfacing, flares, etc.) eats away at that armor.
Also, he was the first person to convey to the author that the submarine force is
prepared to contribute to the naval diplomatic problem within a limited war-
fighting concept. Specifically, the preference for a NCA political announcement
that is ambiguous concerning enforcement and with ROE that allow the submarine
to sink ships meeting ROE criteria. LCDR Russo's thoughts are specific to the non -
desirability of stating a specific enforcement platform, which uould allow the
opposition time to de\ elope tactics to counter that platform.
On the larger spectrum of general naval diplomacy, the West is anxiously
awaiting fleet deployment of the Tiblisi- class conventional take-off and landing
(CTOL) aircraft carriers. These platforms are without precedent in the Soviet
Navy, and consequently there has been considerable debate within the West over
how these ships will "fit" in the Soviet Navy's war-fighting scheme. Yet, there is
little question that "peacetime'' missions are likely to include U.S. style "carrier-
diplomacy." If so, the U.S. Navy will be confronted with new challenges and new
opportunities. For example, a repeat of the U.S. -Soviet fleet stand-offs in the
Mediterranean Sea in 1967 and 1973 might this time be highlighted by a
confrontation of carrier battle groups, a phenomena not seen since the Pacific
theater of the Second World War. The challenge for the American commander will
be an unprecedented naval air threat environment. But this challenge will bring
its own opportunities as well, for arguably, the presence this time of a very high-
value unit, i.e. the carrier, is liable to make the Soviet force more vulnerable to
submarine coercive diplomacy. Therefore, the political utility of U.S. submarine
force will continue to grow in the area of its greatest current applicability, U.S.-
Soviet "perception management.
5. The Third World
Perception management concerning in the Third World through the use
of submarines must receive greater attention. In the words of Manthorpe, "there
is no reason to ignore the contributions of the submarine force in Third World
perception management." [Ref. 27J The proliferation of anti-ship missiles and
submarines poses a mounting threat to the "traditional" paradigm of naval
diplomacy. The naval diplomacy environment is becoming more dangerous for the
surface ship and an alarming trend is beginning, whereby, "gunboat diplomacy will
become the tool of the little guy." [Ref. 76]
This view foresees the political leadership of the major naval powers as
becoming unwilling to risk the tremendous political and military "black eye"
resulting from naval assets destroyed or severely damaged by a Third World
nation. This will be especially so, if the political leadership is unwilling or unable,
for whatever reasons, to go to war against a Third World nation. Thus, to engender
this situation the Third World navy must be able to hold "traditional" naval
diplomacy platforms at risk with ASMs or submarines, while ensuring that the
larger naval power's high-level national interests—issues worth going to war
over--are not at stake. This will provide some degree of naval diplomatic-
autonomy for the Third World navy equipped with advanced weapons.
The use of submarines by the larger naval power offers a practicable
competitive naval diplomacy strategy. While, a Third World navy may be equipped
with advanced weaponry, such as ASMs or submarines, it most likely lacks
sufficient ASW capability to combat the modern SSN. Conversely, ASW is a strong
suit of larger naval powers. Short of mine warfare and minor numbers of late-
generation conventional submarines, at the present, there is no serious threat to
the SSN from Third World navies. Thus, the submarine will gain a larger role in
naval diplomacy concerning the Third World environment.
C. CONCLUSION
The importance of the submarine in naval diplomacy has been evolving
slowly, but in the future the evolutionary pace will quicken. If submarines
currentlyhave a role to plaj in naval diplomacy, that role is not un the same order
as frigates, destroyers, cruisers, or even battleships or aircraft carriers; these
ships remain the common currency of naval diplomacy. The battleship and aircraft
carrier have been trump cards in the past, but have lost their distinction through
common usage. The proliferation of anti-ship missiles has made the submarine's,
once "disproportionate" threat of force a relatively more appropriate and credible
threat. The nuclear attack submarine is becoming a true trump card. 26 It does,
however, have its limitations. It is designed now to be used against naval forces,
merchant fleets, or for clandestine commando missions, and against land targets
appropriate for Tomahawk. Likewise, as cited in the works of Cable and Grove, the
limited force capability of the submarine is now confined near the upper bound of
naval diplomacy. Its most efficient use would be, in effect, nonuse; but, nonuse
with benefit can only occur after announcement and previous establishment of
credibility.
A trump card is held back as long as the player remains strong in the suit of
appropriate force being played. As the game progresses, the cards of the
appropriate force suit dwindle in number. When appropriate force is exhausted or
unproductive, the trumping force of the submarine can gain control of the game.
A trump card is led only from a position of extraordinary strength ui weakness.
26 The game of Hearts provides an appropriate analogy. The object is to force
points on your opponents. There is one point suit, hearts, and one trump suit,
spades. Additionally the Queen of Spades counts 13 points, equal to the total of
heart points. In a four handed game each round of the table is called a trick, and
the ranking card wins the trick (and any points contained). An alternate strategy
is to win all the points. This should only be pursued from a position of great
strength, but it scores ~6 points against all opponents. The person that wins the
trick gains control of the game for the next trick, he chooses the suit to be played
with the first card led. The led suit must be followed if possessed. The cards
played are low, to give up control, and high or trump to gain or keep control.
Points, trump, or cards of a neutral suit, are dumped in the trick when players are
exhausted in the suit played.
Weakness here, may be an untenable anti-ship missile threat, or a submarine
being the only platform available. Strength in this analogy corresponds to non-
limited warfare and does not apply. While naval diplomacy proceeds with
appropriate force, the presence of the trumping submarine must be assumed or
communicated. A possible weakness of present U.S. naval diplomacy is that the
trump is not placed in the hand when dealt; adversaries have little indication that
it may be in the deterrent hand. Adversaries must be made cautious not to
exhaust the suit of appropriate force, they must be made wary of the deterrent
trump. The choice to play trump is a strategic one, having both short and long
term costs and benefits. Tactical implications are very short term concerning the
hand being played.
This analogy is not an effort to trivialize naval diplomacy to a common card
game, but an attempt to explain why submarine violence is, and should be, seldom
seen in naval diplomacy. Submarine violence should be seldom seen because it is
credible and is not required at lower force levels of naval diplomacy. When
submarine presence is disclosed, credibility should make the actual use of force
seldom required. Submarines are seldom seen, because the art of applying limited
naval force is most often practiced in an environment of lower force levels, where
submarines are not required and might be considered extraneous and escalatory.
At the higher levels of limited naval force, where survival requires the use of
non-proportional weapons, the limited force capability of the submarine is
potentially credible. However, institutional biases prevent this potentially
credible force from making a contribution to diplomatic leverage, even at this
level. Thus, submarine diplomacy remains incredible to the opposition at the
lowei levels as a deterrent to escalation to higher levels. To the casual observer
during the course of the card game it may be many rounds before trump is played.
That does not mean that trump is not present in the players hands. If naval
diplomacy does not come to violence, or if the violence can be contained to the
visual combatants, the submarine, if present, will not be called upon to
participate. Thus, the presence of the submarine could be denied; however, it may
be a better choice not to deny it.
This study suggests these recommendations for action to provide a greater
understanding and improve the credibility of the submarine in naval diplomacy:
• Incorporate scenarios of coercive naval diplomatic SSN usage into existing
naval planning, training, and exercise infrastructures.
• At the NCA level, investigate the requirements for the SPIN, including
methods of transmittal for different crisis scenarios. Also, provide feedback
to the Navy on acceptable SSN employment scenarios.
• Initiate a viability analysis on the production and use of proportional
weapons in submarine diplomacy.
• As the opportunity presents itself, gradually increase employment of SSNs
in the naval diplomacy role to condition domestic and international
acceptance and improve the credibility of submarine diplomacy.
Finally, it must be reiterated that several aspects are making the use of
submarines more practicable in modern naval diplomacy. First, the diminishing
distinction between the nonproportional weapons of surface ships and submarines
in the missile age. Second, the submarine is unthreatened by anti-ship missiles
and the multiple platforms that carry them as opposed to surface ships which may
be required to protect themselves prematurely. And third, as more Third World
nations obtain ASMs and submarines to defend their "claimed" 200 nautical mile
exclusive economic zones, greater threats will be met as opposition in naval
diplomacy. The SSN is a single credible platform to oppose these threats, as
contrasted to the multitude of surface combatants required to provide the same
level of opposition; or more simply stated, one stealthy, ubiquitous SLCM carrying
SSN can fullfil several (but not all) of the traditional naval diplomacy duties of
an entire carrier battle group and defend itself inexpensively and effectively. It

















































27 This data was compiled from the patrol reports of U.S. SSBNs. The current
Poseidon operational base at Holy Loch (Scotland) and previous operational bases
at Rota (Spain), and Guam would not be included in this data. In the early 1980s
Polaris and Poseidon submarines were removed from the Pacific deterrent patrol
cycle as Trident submarines came on line. After that, Guam was no longer an
operational base for SSBNs; thus, visits to Guam by Trident submarines along with
other visits to U.S. protectorates, for the purposes of this documentation, are
treated as foreign port visits.
Also of note, the author participated in the port visit of USS Thomas
Jefferson (SSBN-618) to Chinhae, Korea in August 1980. Thus, it could be
presumed that the Pacific Polaris and Poseidon submarines during the late 1970s



















































































7-11 JANUARY PLYMOUTH, U.K.
23-25 JANUARY NAPLES, ITALY
9 FEBRUARY LISBON, PORTUGAL
8-11 MAY LISBON, PORTUGAL
21-25 JULY PORT CABELLO, VENEZUELA
Source: Naval Operations Intelligence Center, Suitland, Maryland.
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